Beneficiaries are actors too.pdf - Southern Institute of Peace ...
Beneficiaries are actors too.pdf - Southern Institute of Peace ...
Beneficiaries are actors too.pdf - Southern Institute of Peace ...
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formulation will ensure their total buy in and commitment<br />
towards the success <strong>of</strong> the project. They will become full<br />
participants in the project and they will willingly police and<br />
enforce agreed rules and regulations. Community compliance will<br />
thus be achieved through community participation and<br />
cooperation not forceful enforcement <strong>of</strong> by-laws. Trained game<br />
scouts or rangers will then be used to compliment and augment<br />
traditional community enforcement machinery. Community<br />
members need to participate in (for example) quota setting, anti<br />
poaching, anti trespassing and anti vandalism campaigns.<br />
Invariably poachers <strong>are</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the community and hence<br />
only fellow community members know them better and how to<br />
deal with them.<br />
Devolution <strong>of</strong> authority or responsibility?<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the main constraints <strong>of</strong> the CAMPFIRE programme is the<br />
unwillingness by district councils to devolve authority to host<br />
communities to manage their own natural resources, preferring<br />
instead to devolve logistical responsibilities <strong>of</strong> day to day<br />
functions with no real decision making (IIED report, 1994, Jones,<br />
1999). This centralization <strong>of</strong> authority around district councils<br />
has also resulted in some councils failing to remit in full and on<br />
time revenue realized from natural resource utilisation to the host<br />
communities. This has had a demoralizing and paralyzing effect<br />
to the communities who rightfully feel short-changed by the<br />
appropriate authorities. A top-down approach to the<br />
management <strong>of</strong> natural resources should be limited as this tends<br />
to make the programme insensitive to the priorities <strong>of</strong> the<br />
community and predisposed to a militaristic use <strong>of</strong> uniformed<br />
paramilitary guards with negligent regard for the community<br />
aspirations. However caution needs to be exercised when<br />
devolving authority to the host communities as absolute<br />
devolution may result in the politically powerful and local elites<br />
individualizing a communal project.<br />
Spreading the benefits<br />
Host communities endure social and economic costs <strong>of</strong><br />
conserving natural resources within their localities and hence it is<br />
only reasonable that they should enjoy the benefits <strong>of</strong> suffering.<br />
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