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6.1.3. Nuclear Policy Options,
Under the assumption that the reactor/fuel cycles listed in Tables 6.1-2 and 6.1-3
could be deployed, a set of nuclear policy options were developed for studying the relative
capabilities of the various reactors to produce civilian nuclear power during the period
from 1980 to 2050.
As was pointed out above, it was assumed that for a system to be
adequate, it should have an installed nuclear capacity of 350 GWe by the year 2000 and a
net increase of 15 GWe thereafter, with each plant having a 30-yr lifetime.
(Note: In
order to determine the effect of a lower growth rate, a few cases were also run for an
installed capacity of 200 GWe in the year 2000 and 10 GWe/yr thereafter.) It was also
assumed that reactors fueled with natural, low-enriched, slightly enriched, or denatured
uranium could be dispersed outside the secure energy centers and those fueled with highly
enriched uranium or with plutonium would be confined within the centers. All enrichment,
reprocessing, and fabricating facilities would also be confined within the centers.
The nuclear policy options fell under four'major categories: (1) the throwaway/
stowaway option; (2) classical plutonium-uranium options; (3) denatured uranium options
employing thermal converters only; and' (4) denatured uranium options employing both converters
and breeders.
The various options under these categories are described in Table 6.1-4, and
the specific reactors utilized in each option are indicated in Table 6.1-5.
sentations of the options are presented in Figs. 6.1-1 through 6.1-4.
both intermediate-cost and high-cost y308 supply assumptions.
Schematic repre-
Runs were made for
These nuclear options cannot be viewed as predictions of the future insofar as nuclear
power is concerned; however, they can provide a logic framework by which the future implica-
tion of current nuclear policy decisions can be understood.
of natSbns agree to supply nuclear fuel to another group of nations providing the latter
agree to forego reprocessing. A careful analysis of the nuclear system options outlined
above can illustrate the logical consequences of such a decision upon the civilian nuclear
power systems in both groups of nations. Only those nations providing the fuel would main-
tain secure energy centers, since the nations receiving the fuel would be operating dispersed
reactors only. (Note: The analysis presented here considers only the U.S. ore supply. A
similar analysis for a group of nations would begin with different assumptions regarding the
ore supply and nuclear energy demand.)
Suppose, for example, a group
For the purposes of this analysis, all the nuclear system options were assumed to be
mutually exclusive.
its ultimate end.
That is, it was assumed that any option selected would be pursued to
In actuality, a nation would have the ability to change policies if con-
sequences of the policy in effect were determined to be undesirable.
to successfully change a policy at a future date would be quite limited if the necessity
of changing has not been identified and incorporated into the current program. The purpose
of the study contained in this report was to identify the basic nuclear system options, and
to determine the consequences of pursuing them to their ultimate end. (Note: A study of the
consequences of changing policies at a future date - and thereby the implication of current
programs - will be analyzed in a later study.)
However, the ability
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