ORNL-5388 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site
ORNL-5388 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site
ORNL-5388 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site
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2.2. THE DENATURED 233U FUEL CYCLE<br />
In <strong>the</strong> denatured 233U cycle, <strong>the</strong> fresh fuel would consist of a mixture of fissile 233U<br />
diluted with 23eU (<strong>the</strong> denaturant) and combined with <strong>the</strong> fertile isotope thorium. The pre-<br />
sence of a significant quantity of 23eU denaturant would preclude direct use of <strong>the</strong> fissile<br />
material for weapons purposes even if <strong>the</strong> uranium and thorium were chemically separated. As<br />
in <strong>the</strong> LEU cycle, an additional step, that of isotopic enrichment of <strong>the</strong> uranium, this time<br />
to increase its 233U concentration, would be necessary to produce weapons-grade material ,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> development of an enrichment capability would require a significant decision and com-<br />
mitment well in advance of <strong>the</strong> actual diversion of fissile material from <strong>the</strong> fresh fuel.<br />
This is in contrast to <strong>the</strong> reference Pu/U fresh fuel for which only chemical separation would<br />
be required. Moreover, even if such an enrichment capability were developed, it would ap-<br />
pear that enriching clandestinely obtained natural uranium would be preferable to diverting<br />
and enriching reactor fuel, whe<strong>the</strong>r it be denatured 233U or some o<strong>the</strong>r type, since <strong>the</strong> reactor<br />
fuel would be more internationally "accountable."<br />
The primary advantage of <strong>the</strong> denatured fuel cycle is <strong>the</strong> inclusion of this "isotopic<br />
barrier" in <strong>the</strong> fuel. Whereas ir, <strong>the</strong> plutonium cycle no denaturant comparable to 238U exists<br />
and <strong>the</strong> fresh fuel safeguards (that is, physical security, international monitoring, etc.)<br />
would all be external to <strong>the</strong> fuel, <strong>the</strong> denatured 233U fuel cycle would incorporate an in-<br />
herent safeguard advantage as a physical property of <strong>the</strong> fuel itself. Like <strong>the</strong> plutonium<br />
cycle, <strong>the</strong> denatured fuel cycle would require <strong>the</strong> development of fuel cycle centers to<br />
safeguard sensitive fuel cycle activities such as reprocessing (but not necessarily refabri-<br />
cation). However, unlike <strong>the</strong> plutonium cycle, <strong>the</strong> denatured fuel cycle would not require<br />
<strong>the</strong> extension of such stringent safeguard procedures to <strong>the</strong> reactors <strong>the</strong>mselves, and <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are <strong>the</strong> most numerous component of <strong>the</strong> nuclear fuel cycle.<br />
"denatured" in <strong>the</strong> sense that a low concentration of 23% is included in a 23'3U matrix.<br />
Similarly, natural uranium fuel is denatured.<br />
resistance advantages of <strong>the</strong> isotopic barrier.)<br />
(As noted above, LEU fuel is also<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong>se fuels also have <strong>the</strong> proliferation-<br />
The concept of denatured 233U fuel as a proliferation-resistant step is addressed<br />
principally at <strong>the</strong> front end of <strong>the</strong> nuclear fuel cycle, that is, <strong>the</strong> fresh fuel charged<br />
to reactors. The 238U denaturant will, of course, produce plutonium under irradiation.<br />
Thus, as in <strong>the</strong> LEU and mixed oxide cycles, <strong>the</strong> spent fuel from <strong>the</strong> denatured cycle is a<br />
potential source of plutonium. However, also as in <strong>the</strong> LEU and mixed oxide cycles, <strong>the</strong><br />
plutonium generated in <strong>the</strong> spent fuel is contaminated with highly radioactive fission products.<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> quantity of plutonium generated via <strong>the</strong> denatured fuel cycle will be signif-<br />
icantly less than that of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two cycles. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> decision to use spent<br />
reactor fuel as a source of weapons material requires a previous commitment to <strong>the</strong> develop-<br />
ment of shielded extraction facilities.<br />
In sumnary, <strong>the</strong> use of a denatured fuel as a<br />
source of weapons material implies one of two strategic decisions:<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of an<br />
isotopic enrichment capability to process diverted fresh fuel, or <strong>the</strong> development of a, fisc<br />
sile extraction capability (chemical or isotopic) to process diverted spent fuel.<br />
In