ORNL-5388 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site

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2.0. INTRODUCTION
The primary rationale for considering the pro1 iferation potential of the nuclear
fuel cycles associated with civilian power reactors derives from two opposing concerns:
the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation versus a need for and the perceived
economic/resource benefits of a nuclear-based generating capacity. At the outset it should
be emphasized that a civilian nuclear power program is not the only proliferation route
available to nonnuclear weapons states. The countries that have developed nuclear explosives
to date have not relied on a civilian nuclear power program to obtain the fissile material.
Rather, they have utilized enrichment facilities, plutonium-production reactors, and, more
recently, a research reactor. Moreover, as opposed to a deliberate (and possibly clande-
stine) weapons-development program based upon a national decision, nuclear power programs
are currently subject to international monitoring and influence in most cases. Thus while
civilian nuclear power does represent one conceivable proliferation route, if it is made
less attractive than other possible routes, proliferation concerns should not inhibit the
development of comnercial nuclear power.
Pro1 iferation concerns regarding civi 1 ian nuclear power programs center on two
intrinsic characteristics of the'nuclear fuel cycle.
inherently provides a potential source of fissile material from which production of
weapons-grade material is possible.
enrichment and reprocessing facilities, exacerbate the proliferation problem since they
provide a technological capability which could be directed towards weapons development.
The term "latent proliferation' has been coined by Feiveson and Taylor' to cover these
characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle which, although 'not pertaining directly to
weapons development, by their existence facilitate a possible future decision to
establish such a capability.
First, nuclear reactor fuel
Second, certain fuel cycle components, particularly
It should be noted that the problem of latent proliferation impacts even the "once-
through" low-enriched uranium (LEU) cycle currently employed in 1 ight-water reactors (LWRS)
and also the natural-uranium cycle utilized in the Canadian heavy-water systems (CANDUs).
The technology required to enrich natural uranium to LWR fuel represents a technological
capability which could be redirected from.peacefu1 purposes. In addition, the plutonium-
containing spent fuel, albeit dilute and contaminated with highly radioactive fission .
products, represents a source of potential weapons material. Thus the possibility of
proliferation exists even for the fuel cycles now in use. This has already been recog-
nized and it has been proposed1n2 that internationally controlled fuel cycle service
centers be established whose purpose would be to preclude subversion of sensitive
technology (such as enrichment technology) and to provide facilities for the assay and
secure storage of spent once-through reactor fuel.