CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Legal dimensions of international framework agreements – Sobczak<br />
Powers of signatories<br />
The legal nature of a standard depends on the powers conferred on<br />
its authors, in particular if the norm aims at defining rules of conduct<br />
applying to third parties. Given the lack of a legal framework in the field<br />
of transnational collective bargaining, no power has been explicitly conferred<br />
by labour law on any actor. Consequently, those who want to<br />
adopt IFAs have to invent new solutions.<br />
Signatories — employers<br />
On the employers’ side, one or more representatives of the holding<br />
company signs the IFA, even if the negotiations may in some cases also<br />
involve managers from different subsidiaries of the group. 3 This solution<br />
may reflect the reality of economic powers within the group, but from a<br />
legal point of view it constitutes a problem, because each of the subsidiaries<br />
has its own legal personality, even if it is highly integrated in the<br />
group. There is indeed a divorce between the holding company’s control<br />
over an economic activity within the group and its lack of legal liability<br />
for the social consequences of this activity (Del Cont, 1997; Rorive,<br />
2004). This makes it impossible to consider the holding company as the<br />
employer of the workers in the subsidiaries (Supiot, 1985), and means<br />
that the holding company may not conclude collective agreements that<br />
bind the subsidiaries. This problem is even greater if the IFA defines rules<br />
for subcontractors and suppliers, whose own legal personality excludes<br />
the possibility of the company negotiating for them.<br />
To allow companies to conclude IFAs for their subsidiaries and subcontractors,<br />
they need to receive a mandate to negotiate legally binding<br />
commitments. The Directive of 22 September 1994 on European Works<br />
Councils uses this legal technique (European Council, 1994). For groups<br />
within the EU, the Directive imposes the obligation on the holding company<br />
of opening negotiations on information and consultation across the<br />
whole group. However, the mandate to negotiate is explicitly conferred<br />
by the Directive. Furthermore, an agreement to establish a European<br />
works council (EWC) only creates obligations for the holding company,<br />
not for the subsidiaries.<br />
3<br />
As with Electricité de France (EDF), for example.<br />
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