CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...

Cross-border social dialogue and agreements
Finally, the geographical issue arises because the EWC Directive
formally only applies to EU countries, but leaves agreement on the
actual coverage of the council to the social counterparts. Most companies
seek to limit the EWCs to the EU only (the issue here is not so much
Norway and Switzerland but those Eastern European countries that are
not in the EU). The union interest is of course to secure the maximum
coverage, ideally of every single operation of the company regardless of
its location anywhere in the world. Thus most EWCs are confined to the
EU, some cover all of geographical Europe and at least three are worldwide
in scope.
Since the social counterparts are largely free to make their own
arrangements when establishing an EWC, there is no reason why unions
should obediently restrict themselves to the letter of the Directive. In the
end, the structure and functions of an EWC boil down to a question of
the existing balance of power, which of course applies to any negotiating
situation. Admittedly, given the present balance of social and political
power in the EU Member States and in the Commission, it is unlikely
that much progress can be achieved at this time through a revision of the
EWC Directive.
Because the EWCs represent, at least temporarily, a dead end, some
GUFs such as the IMF have revived the world councils. Union Network
International, for its part, has created a number of international union
networks at TNC level, which appear to be, in fact, world councils in a
more flexible form.
Conclusions: Back to the future?
As we noted above, the significance and value of an IFA very much
depend on the purpose it is intended to serve, which, in turn, is confirmed
(or not) by its results.
The broader issue is: to what extent can IFAs still be considered the
elements of an emerging architecture of international labour-management
relations in a global political context that is increasingly hostile to
trade union rights? In such a context, there is a danger that TNCs will be
more and more tempted to ignore “social partnership” arrangements,
while the options for unions are narrowing down to their “core business”
— rebuilding power relations through struggle.
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