CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Cross-border social dialogue and agreements<br />
for Ford, one for General Motors (GM), a common council for Chrysler-<br />
Simca-Rootes, and a common council for Volkswagen/Mercedes-Benz.<br />
In March 1971, delegates from seven world auto company councils<br />
met in London and adopted a common declaration that assigned union<br />
coordination and international solidarity to those councils. In the first<br />
part of the declaration, the delegates called for meetings of each council<br />
with the top management of their corporation. Information on production<br />
plans and job security figured among “the priority items” to be discussed.<br />
Common contract expiration dates were also to be sought. In the<br />
second part of the declaration, the delegates appealed to governments and<br />
international organizations to establish enforceable rules of conduct for<br />
MNEs (Metall-Pressedienst, 1971; Gallin, this volume).<br />
In the following years, over 60 councils were established, covering<br />
all sectors (Tudyka, 1986; Rüb, 2002). The figure seems impressive but<br />
is weak relative to the overall number of MNEs. Some of these councils<br />
still exist but others were short-lived. In most cases they consisted in<br />
meeting structures for the union officials of the national federations that<br />
met every two or three years during the world congresses of the ITSs or<br />
the sector international conferences. The councils seldom comprised representatives<br />
elected by different subsidiaries’ employees. A working group<br />
on MNEs, set up by the IMB to assess the world councils’ activities, highlighted<br />
these kinds of internal organizational shortcomings in 1991<br />
(IMB, 1993, pp. 174f).<br />
Furthermore, certain ITSs sometimes used the world councils as a<br />
means of reinforcing their own power within the labour movement in<br />
relation to the affiliated national federations or to the international confederations<br />
that they either worked with (such as the International Confederation<br />
of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU]) or competed with (such as the<br />
World Confederation of Labour and the World Federation of Trade<br />
Unions [WFTU]). Several ITS leaders were openly anticommunist, and<br />
the ideological struggle was detrimental to the unity and efficiency of<br />
international trade union action. Often, as in the French case with the<br />
Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and the Confédération<br />
française démocratique du travail (CFDT), it meant the exclusion of the<br />
most representative unions of the MNE’s headquarters.<br />
The following two examples give an idea of the complexity and difficulties<br />
of transnational union coordination at the time. At Michelin the<br />
CGT, then the majority union in the company, had set up in 1968 within<br />
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