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CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...

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Cross-border social dialogue and agreements<br />

for Ford, one for General Motors (GM), a common council for Chrysler-<br />

Simca-Rootes, and a common council for Volkswagen/Mercedes-Benz.<br />

In March 1971, delegates from seven world auto company councils<br />

met in London and adopted a common declaration that assigned union<br />

coordination and international solidarity to those councils. In the first<br />

part of the declaration, the delegates called for meetings of each council<br />

with the top management of their corporation. Information on production<br />

plans and job security figured among “the priority items” to be discussed.<br />

Common contract expiration dates were also to be sought. In the<br />

second part of the declaration, the delegates appealed to governments and<br />

international organizations to establish enforceable rules of conduct for<br />

MNEs (Metall-Pressedienst, 1971; Gallin, this volume).<br />

In the following years, over 60 councils were established, covering<br />

all sectors (Tudyka, 1986; Rüb, 2002). The figure seems impressive but<br />

is weak relative to the overall number of MNEs. Some of these councils<br />

still exist but others were short-lived. In most cases they consisted in<br />

meeting structures for the union officials of the national federations that<br />

met every two or three years during the world congresses of the ITSs or<br />

the sector international conferences. The councils seldom comprised representatives<br />

elected by different subsidiaries’ employees. A working group<br />

on MNEs, set up by the IMB to assess the world councils’ activities, highlighted<br />

these kinds of internal organizational shortcomings in 1991<br />

(IMB, 1993, pp. 174f).<br />

Furthermore, certain ITSs sometimes used the world councils as a<br />

means of reinforcing their own power within the labour movement in<br />

relation to the affiliated national federations or to the international confederations<br />

that they either worked with (such as the International Confederation<br />

of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU]) or competed with (such as the<br />

World Confederation of Labour and the World Federation of Trade<br />

Unions [WFTU]). Several ITS leaders were openly anticommunist, and<br />

the ideological struggle was detrimental to the unity and efficiency of<br />

international trade union action. Often, as in the French case with the<br />

Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and the Confédération<br />

française démocratique du travail (CFDT), it meant the exclusion of the<br />

most representative unions of the MNE’s headquarters.<br />

The following two examples give an idea of the complexity and difficulties<br />

of transnational union coordination at the time. At Michelin the<br />

CGT, then the majority union in the company, had set up in 1968 within<br />

46

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