CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...

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Cross-border social dialogue and agreements corrective rather than punitive, so that some shipowners wait until they are caught to make repairs. There are also many possibilities for evasion, and it is impossible to carry out a thorough safety inspection in the time available to PSC inspectors (Bloor, 2003). Nonetheless, tightening PSC enforcement appears to have had an effect on flag State behaviour, because some flag States have responded to pressure from shipowners to raise standards by deregistering low-standard shipowners. Because of improved flag State control, remaining shipowners are subject to less scrutiny by PSC. In this way, the “club” effect created by PSC is mediated through flag States (DeSombre, 2006, pp. 98-114). In a statement by the group of union leaders representing the seafarers’ side of the MLC negotiations, the seafarers’ group explained the relationship between PSC and flag State responsibilities: “Port State Control in the ILO context would be based on compliance with the CMLC [MLC] at shipboard rather than flag State level. It would not displace the primary obligation of the flag State …” (Seafarers’ Group Statement, 2005). Labour supply States Giving a regulatory role to the labour supply State, or seafarer’s State of residence, is a relatively recent innovation. Labour supply State obligations have now been included in international conventions relating to skill certification, identity documents and recruitment (Dirks, 2001). Although labour supply States rarely have the authority or capacity to intervene comprehensively in shipping regulation, they do have some authority over and responsibility towards their seafarers, and are therefore another link in the chain of responsibility. Most important, it is the labour supply States that train and certify — or as sometimes happens, fail to train adequately but certify anyway — the seafarers who work on open register shipping. As a result, during the 1990s, at the urging of the maritime industry and trade unions, national governments revised and updated a 1978 IMC Convention, Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping, and made it enforceable through PSC and a “White List” of labour supply countries deemed to be compliant. This amendment, known as STCW 95, places an onus on labour supply States to show that their training schools can adequately educate seafarers to international standards. The threat of exclusion from the international labour market, by omission from the White List, is the incentive for labour supply States to improve seafarer training, as shipowners will not want to hire seafarers whose certificates attract extra 200
The ILO Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 – Lillie attention from PSC (Lillie, 2006, pp. 89-104). Labour supply States are less directly involved in enforcement of the MLC. However, they are expected to enforce the requirements of the MLC on labour-recruitment agencies operating in their territory, which mainly relate to ensuring that the costs of using recruitment agencies are borne by the shipowner, and not the seafarer. Labour market competition The interests of labour market actors in the MLC negotiations were conditioned by the extreme globalization of the labour market that occurred under the FOC system. The seafarers’ group interests were firmly embedded in the ITF’s strategy of global maritime labour market control. Likewise within the shipowners’ group, both the conciliatory and hard-line interest groupings reflected different views on how to best deal with the ITF’s bargaining strategy. Both seafarers’ and shipowners’ group interests were therefore influenced by global maritime labour market conditions, and the manner in which the seafaring labour market has globalized. Although not all ships competing in international trade are under FOCs, the competitive dynamic of the industry is defined by the FOC institution. This rose to significance after World War II, and has become particularly prevalent since the 1970s (Northup and Rowan, 1983). Since FOCs do not generally have nationality-based hiring restrictions, multinational ship crews are now the norm, and a global institutional infrastructure has developed to hire ship crews from low-wage seafaring labour-supply countries for work anywhere in the world (Alderton et al., 2004). The freedom to hire from anywhere has allowed maritime labour sourcing to shift geographically, searching for suitable labour at the lowest possible cost. Just after World War II, FOC crews were drawn from many diverse countries, including those in northern Europe. By the 1970s, northern Europeans had become too expensive, and sourcing shifted to southern Europe, the Republic of Korea, and Africa. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Filipinos began to displace other groups, in part as a result of the Philippine Government’s policy of encouraging the export of cheap labour for foreign exchange (CIIR, 1987). With the opening of the eastern bloc, the Russian Federation and other post-Communist countries challenged the primacy of the Philippines and India (which has always been a major seafaring labour supplier) by flooding the market with highly trained seafarers (Johnsson, 1996). 201
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CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AG
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Published by the International Inst
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Cross-border social dialogue and ag
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Contributors Dominique Bé, an econ
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Contributors Nathan Lillie is Assis
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Acronyms BWI Building and Wood Work
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Introduction Konstantinos Papadakis
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Introduction - Papadakis each with
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Introduction - Papadakis above. Thi
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Introduction - Papadakis tices unde
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Introduction - Papadakis role of co
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Introduction - Papadakis veaux enje
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Chapter 1 International framework a
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International framework agreements:
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Chapter 3 International framework a
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International framework agreements
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Part 3 Legal dimensions 113
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Appendix
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