CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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International framework agreements: A reassessment – Dan Gallin<br />
The Danone agreement, including its subsidiary agreements,<br />
remains the most far-reaching IFA to date, and has set the pattern for further<br />
IUF agreements with TNCs (for example, Accor, Chiquita and<br />
Fonterra) (Tørres and Gunnes, 2003, p. 9).<br />
There has been some speculation as to why Danone was the first<br />
company to agree to an IFA of this nature. The personal views of <strong>An</strong>toine<br />
Riboud, its founder and CEO until 1996, were undoubtedly an important<br />
factor. Riboud, who died in 2002, was a progressive Catholic with<br />
links to the French Socialist Party and viewed trade unions as legitimate<br />
counterparts at all levels. As he declared in a meeting with an IUF delegation,<br />
he wanted strong unions in his company because he could not<br />
imagine leading his company against its employees and without respecting<br />
their rights. There is no doubt that this was his sincere belief. Riboud<br />
was a man of honour.<br />
The experiences of the IUF at that time, however, also played a role.<br />
All TNCs (including Danone) in the IUF’s scope had realized that the<br />
IUF was becoming a serious counterpart. As we have seen, the IUF had<br />
sustained a bruising conflict with Nestlé in 1973, although in the end it<br />
had been resolved on union terms. In 1980, the IUF conducted a major<br />
conflict with the Coca-Cola Company, in order to secure the survival of<br />
a union at a bottling subsidiary in Guatemala (Reyes and Gatehouse,<br />
1987, pp. 10-13; Frundt, 1987, pp. 61-3). <strong>An</strong> international campaign<br />
involving solidarity strikes at Coke plants in several countries, demonstrations<br />
and negative publicity, with widespread support from nongovernmental<br />
organizations (NGOs) and political groups, obliged the<br />
company to buy the subsidiary plant, recognize the enterprise union and<br />
intervene so that the Government ceased its anti-union terror campaign,<br />
at least in that plant.<br />
However, four years later, the directors whom Coca-Cola had put<br />
in charge of the plant absconded, and declared the plant bankrupt —<br />
leaving at least half a million dollars unaccounted for (Reyes and Gatehouse,<br />
1987, pp. 23-24). The workers, who had feared that something<br />
like this might happen, occupied the plant the same day (18 February<br />
1984). The IUF again made representations to the Coca-Cola Company,<br />
and the company initially refused to take responsibility (as in 1980).<br />
The company’s assumption that the IUF would not be able to replicate<br />
its campaign of 1980 proved unfounded. In fact, the 1984 campaign<br />
was even stronger than the first one. It involved: unions that had previ-<br />
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