CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Legal dimensions of international framework agreements – Sobczak<br />
at all levels of the company, thus reinforcing the chances that the agreement<br />
will be effective.<br />
Almost all IFAs establish regular monitoring either by the EWC or<br />
by a special committee of the signatories. At least one annual meeting is<br />
usually held between the management and workers’ representatives on<br />
the actions that they have adopted and the difficulties that they have<br />
faced. The meeting can sometimes be used to define indicators in order<br />
to evaluate the impact of the agreement. Very few IFAs explicitly mention<br />
inviting NGOs to these meetings. (Such invitations might well mark<br />
the first step from a bilateral social dialogue to a trilateral civil dialogue.)<br />
The signatories can amend the initial text during the annual meeting;<br />
several IFAs explicitly allow this. No problem will arise if all signatories<br />
agree to the amendment, but lack of consensus may cause a legal<br />
problem. In any case, each of the signatories is permitted to unilaterally<br />
cancel the agreement. Such a cancellation should have no practical<br />
impact if only one of the representatives on the workers’ side cancels the<br />
IFA, and the management and at least one of the different workers’ representatives<br />
continue to support the agreement.<br />
Legal value<br />
Given their lack of a specific legal framework, IFAs are often considered<br />
to be “soft law”, that is, no breach can be taken to the courts (for<br />
example, Hepple, 2002, p. 241). In this way, the argument runs, IFAs<br />
differ from legislative standards and collective agreements since these<br />
instruments have legal effect in most of Europe. Yet this analysis can be<br />
challenged for two reasons. First, the legally binding character of a standard<br />
constitutes no guarantee of effective implementation (Lascoumes<br />
and Serverin, 1986; Hepple, 2005, p. 66). Beyond the legal value, the<br />
social partners’ collective “ownership” of the norm should also be considered.<br />
The involvement of workers’ representatives in drawing up and<br />
monitoring IFAs may contribute to their — and workers’ — ownership.<br />
Consequently, IFAs may be no less effective than other social norms.<br />
Second, examples in other fields show that courts may recognize the legal<br />
effect of IFAs.<br />
Legal nature<br />
IFAs are not an existing legal category, and may not be considered<br />
the same as collective agreements as they are defined in national labour<br />
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