CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...

The ILO Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 – Lillie
the social partners exercise a great deal of influence. The social partners
often treat governments as an audience to be influenced on issues where
the social partners cannot find agreement. This is not to say that governments
have no substantial influence. They are not only “swing” voters on
key issues, but they also greatly influence the real world impact of the
convention by ratifying it or not. Their influence, is, however, more passive
than that of the social partners, in that the social partners shape the
convention according to their preferences within the constraints of what
they believe will be acceptable to a critical mass of governments.
Within negotiations, discussions are divided into plenary meetings
and caucuses. Governments’, unions’ and employers’ groups are all present
at plenary meetings chaired by an elected Conference President from
the governments’ ranks, or by one of the three vice-presidents from the
governments’, employers’ or workers’ ranks. In plenary, group spokespeople
are usually the only ones to speak from among the social partners,
meaning each social partner group speaks with one voice. Governments,
however, generally speak for themselves. Although they have a group rapporteur,
this is purely for reporting purposes. Plenary sessions alternate
with group meetings, which are closed strategy sessions where each group
attempts to arrive at a unitary position.
In the MLC caucuses, the unions’ and employers’ groups tended to
be dominated by core constituents who were well networked and
informed about the issues under discussion. The core groups included the
group chairs, representative(s) from the groups’ international associations
(ITF and ISF), as well as some of the more interested leaders from
national unions or employer associations. However, less central constituents
provided input as well, particularly when representing their own
national situations. Social partner delegates planned strategies for influencing
the positions of specific national governments in the caucuses.
Sometimes, this involved mobilizing a particular union or shipowner delegate
to advise or pressure their national government representative, in
hope of moving the government’s position closer to that of the social partner
group in question. The governments’ group meetings, on the other
hand, were not as much strategy planning sessions as the social partners’
group meetings, but sometimes resembled an extended plenary. Unlike
the views of the unions and employers, government views tended to be
too divergent on contentious issues for a unitary strategy to emerge.
Between the larger and more formal meetings, much of the actual
negotiation (particularly on complex issues) occurred in small specialized
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