CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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International framework agreements: A reassessment – Dan Gallin<br />
negotiated labour-management agreements, it is not the only difference<br />
and actually not always the case: there are some negotiated codes. There<br />
may be a deeper underlying issue, which has to do with the view that<br />
unions take of the purpose of such agreements. If IFAs are primarily<br />
meant to address company behaviour, they may indeed appear to be no<br />
more than a stronger kind of code: stronger, because the outcome of a<br />
negotiation, but not basically different in purpose. If, conversely, IFAs are<br />
seen and used as organizing tools, the contrast with codes becomes much<br />
clearer (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007).<br />
IFAs and European works councils<br />
As a rule, EWCs do not negotiate IFAs and are not signatories to<br />
IFAs. Carley (2001) observes that:<br />
In formal terms, the prospects of EWCs developing a negotiating role are<br />
not very bright. The [EWC] Directive provides for no such role for them,<br />
stating that their purpose is to improve information and consultation and<br />
laying down only an informative/consultative role for statutory EWCs<br />
based on its subsidiary requirements.<br />
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), while supporting<br />
the development of a European framework for transnational collective<br />
bargaining (which should complement the existing framework for<br />
European “social dialogue”), 6 stresses that EWCs do not have a mandate<br />
for negotiations nor the right to sign transnational agreements:<br />
The power to do this must remain solely and strictly a trade union right,<br />
owing to their representativeness long recognized by the Commission,<br />
which also specified as much in a text. Transnational agreements as such<br />
must be left up to collectively responsible and thus players with a mandate<br />
6<br />
A note on terminology is in order. About 20 years ago, a new vocabulary was introduced in the<br />
public discourse on industrial relations, typically involving concepts like “social partners” and “social partnership”<br />
or “social dialogue”. This vocabulary seems to have originated with the EU Treaty of Rome (1984),<br />
but has since, unfortunately, been adopted by the ILO and by most international trade union organizations.<br />
In fact, it is not designed to reflect reality but to hide it. “Partnership”, by any definition, assumes shared interests.<br />
In recent years. it has become increasingly obvious that whatever shared interests may have existed or still<br />
exist between workers and employers, they are overridden by conflicts of opposing interests in most areas of<br />
industrial relations. Today, trade unions do not have “social partners” in any real sense: the accurate term<br />
would be: “social counterparts”. As for “social dialogue”, it is a particularly vague and meaningless term, obviously<br />
designed to dilute the reality of labour-management relations, perhaps to sidestep terms like “negotiation”.<br />
Since vocabulary is never innocent, it is worth reflecting on what interest is served by introducing this<br />
kind of language.<br />
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