CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Cross-border social dialogue and agreements<br />
To guarantee greater legal certainty than at present, a legal framework<br />
for transnational collective bargaining is necessary. Ideally, it should<br />
be adopted at international level, but Europe-wide may constitute a first<br />
step and this seems more attainable in the medium term. The European<br />
Commission’s Social Agenda 2005-2010 gives, as one of its aims, the<br />
adoption of an optional legal framework for transnational collective bargaining,<br />
and a report by a group of labour lawyers appointed by the<br />
Commission has drafted its main elements (Ales et al., 2006).<br />
A legal framework for IFAs may only be optional, the social partners<br />
being free to choose its rules and to benefit from the security it offers<br />
or to continue to negotiate without one. It is indeed crucial not to limit<br />
the dynamics created by IFAs — and more generally by CSR norms —<br />
by a legal framework imposed in a general and uniform manner. IFAs<br />
prove that the lack of a legal framework can favour the emergence of<br />
interesting new forms of social regulation. But it is necessary to offer,<br />
both to companies and to workers’ representatives wanting to go beyond<br />
a voluntary commitment, a framework that defines the legal nature of the<br />
IFA. The social partners would thus have to state explicitly their willingness<br />
to benefit from this optional framework — an “opt-in” clause. If not,<br />
the current “rules” would continue to apply to their agreement.<br />
Such an optional framework should name the legitimate negotiators<br />
on both the employers’ and workers’ sides. It seems particularly<br />
important to set out the roles of ITUFs at sectoral level, of subsidiaries’<br />
national trade unions and of the EWC during the negotiation and the<br />
implementation of the texts. This instrument might also impose on the<br />
social partners a certain minimum content as well as provisions for the<br />
scope of application and for the monitoring process, while leaving the<br />
social partners a wide margin of freedom as to defining the scope and the<br />
forms that monitoring is to take.<br />
Finally, the framework should define the legal value and impact of<br />
IFAs. The best solution would probably be to make it mandatory for the<br />
IFA to be transposed into legal texts in each country where the company<br />
has subsidiaries or even internally within each subsidiary, whether<br />
through unilateral management decisions or through collective agreements.<br />
The legal value of those texts would change according to national<br />
labour law, but this approach would avoid problems associated with<br />
determining which legislation to apply, because the text of the IFA would<br />
exist in each country and have a clear legal value under each country’s law.<br />
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