CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Cross-border social dialogue and agreements<br />
First, it saw “no need for an EU optional framework for transnational<br />
collective bargaining” as existing EC Treaty provisions (Articles<br />
138 and 139) already allowed for cross-industry and sectoral social partners<br />
to negotiate agreements at the European level, while individual<br />
companies were opposed to a framework for transnational collective bargaining<br />
at company level. It also denied the existence of problems of<br />
implementation of transnational texts that would justify the development<br />
of an EU framework for them. If needed, transnational agreements could<br />
rely on national procedures and rules for their implementation.<br />
Second, the organization considered that “transnational social dialogue<br />
in companies is not collective bargaining”: it is just dialogue.<br />
UNICE felt that most transnational texts resulting from transnational<br />
social dialogue “have been discussed with employee representatives” but<br />
they were not agreements as such and, if they were, they were not<br />
intended to be legally binding.<br />
Third, UNICE judged that “the European level is not the right one<br />
to deal with issues tackled in global agreements” as most transnational<br />
texts tackle global issues and have a global scope. Existing international<br />
texts such as the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises<br />
and Social Policy and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and<br />
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were<br />
more appropriate as guidance than an EU initiative, it felt. Moreover, it<br />
stressed that “there is no legal basis in the EU Treaty for the Commission<br />
to propose an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining”.<br />
Fourth, it was concerned that “introducing an EU optional framework<br />
would be counterproductive” to promoting transnational collective<br />
bargaining. The absence of an EU framework was not hampering the<br />
development of transnational collective bargaining but, on the contrary,<br />
putting in place “a one-size-fits-all framework, even if optional, would be<br />
counterproductive” as the implementation of the transnational texts<br />
“must be tailored to the specific company situation and to the legislative<br />
and industrial relations framework in which they operate”. Promoting a<br />
framework for transnational negotiations would “have the effect of rigidifying<br />
the positions of both sides and harm the development of a positive<br />
attitude to social dialogue in multinational companies”, it believed.<br />
Fifth, UNICE considered that “an EU optional framework for<br />
collective bargaining would interfere in national industrial relations” as<br />
it “would lead to the development of EU litigation and enforcement<br />
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