CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENTS: An ...
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Transnational collective bargaining at company level – da Costa and Rehfeldt<br />
the ambit of the WFTU a “European coordination committee” with<br />
union representatives from Michelin’s European subsidiaries. Despite the<br />
ICF’s refusal to join that initiative, several Italian and United Kingdom<br />
(UK) unions of the same tendency took part. The ICF created its own<br />
world council for Michelin only in 1971, after the affiliation of the<br />
CFDT’s chemical federation. Force Ouvrière, a minority union in the<br />
company, only joined it in 1976 (Sinclair, 1978, pp. 80f). At Dunlop-<br />
Pirelli, the ICF created a council in 1972, which excluded the Confederazione<br />
Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (CGIL), the majority union in<br />
the firm. The council was boycotted by UK shop stewards who preferred<br />
to establish bilateral contacts with their Italian CGIL colleagues. 5<br />
Despite a few important successes, international trade union action<br />
did not reach Levinson’s third stage — integrated negotiations — during<br />
his time in office. Reaching stage one — the organization of international<br />
solidarity during industrial conflicts — was difficult enough. The examples<br />
used by Levinson are proof of strong union activism and successful<br />
workers’ efforts for international solidarity in the 1970s.<br />
For stage two, Levinson gives only four examples, three of which<br />
come from France: Saint-Gobain, Michelin and Rhone-Poulenc, as well<br />
as Royal Dutch-Shell. He also mentions “the case of winning wage parity<br />
between Canadian and US workers in the same company” (Levinson,<br />
1972, p. 132). But this was an exceptional example due to the fact that<br />
workers on both sides of the border were members of the same union.<br />
The coordination of their transnational action entailed having strong<br />
strike funds and ensuring that contracts ended at the same time. There<br />
was no language barrier and the historical traditions and industrial relations<br />
structures were quite similar (da Costa, 1999). Yet even in this<br />
example, internal coordination problems existed and, since the 1970s,<br />
there has been a tendency towards union autonomy in Canada; the Canadian<br />
branch of the UAW, for instance, broke away in 1985, becoming the<br />
Canadian Auto Workers. Though this North American model was the<br />
one Levinson had in mind, the complexities of the European situation<br />
added their own difficulties, compounded when other continents were<br />
included.<br />
As for integrated bargaining with the management of an MNE —<br />
Levinson’s stage three — the only example in the 1970s was Philips,<br />
5<br />
These contacts led to what some authors (Moore, 1978; Piehl, 1974) have considered as the first<br />
transnational European strike in 1972.<br />
47