Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
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<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />
An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />
98<br />
9. Board Governance<br />
Board Governance and Business Practices<br />
9.1 “The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and<br />
prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of the company. …<br />
Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a company does… and is<br />
to be distinguished from the day to day operational management of the company by<br />
full-time executives.” 160<br />
9.2 “The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a<br />
framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and<br />
managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the<br />
necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its<br />
objectives and review management performance. The board should set the<br />
company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders<br />
and others are understood and met.” 161<br />
9.3 Bank boards have additional responsibilities compared to those of other<br />
organisations, primarily reflecting the risks associated with banking, the systemic<br />
consequences of bank failure and regulatory requirements attempting to address<br />
these and other risks, including protecting customers. More broadly, bank boards<br />
need to be concerned that their banks enjoy high levels of public trust<br />
and confidence.<br />
9.4 Bank boards have attracted criticism for what went wrong in their banks in the<br />
financial crisis, especially boards of banks that had to be rescued. As a recent<br />
Financial Stability Board (FSB) report noted: “The crisis highlighted that many<br />
boards had directors with little financial industry experience and limited<br />
understanding of the rapidly increasing complexity of the institutions they were<br />
leading. Too often, directors were unable to dedicate sufficient time to understand<br />
the firm’s business model and too deferential to senior management.” 162 Barclays did<br />
not fail and we believe that, among other things, this reflects some strong<br />
engagement from its directors, who took a series of significant decisions in order to<br />
avoid having to take direct support from the Government. But it came very close –<br />
having to work hard, under considerable pressure, to persuade regulators that it was<br />
strong enough to survive without Government support. There are therefore lessons<br />
to be learned for the future, from looking back at Board governance and how it<br />
might have impacted business practices. It is not, however, within our scope to<br />
comment on the Group business strategy.<br />
9.5 As we noted earlier, public trust in banks is at an all-time low. 163 Research suggests trust<br />
in bank employees may be more resilient than trust in banks overall. 164 Nevertheless<br />
160 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code, September 2012, p. 1.<br />
161 Ibid., p. 8.<br />
162 Financial Stability Board, Thematic <strong>Review</strong> of Risk Governance, February 2013, p. 1.<br />
163 Which?, “Banks fail to learn lessons”, 2012.<br />
164 Edelman, Trust Barometer, 2013.