Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
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<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />
An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />
66<br />
― Performance targets and bonus arrangements for traders which encouraged<br />
behaviours to make profits for the bank and for themselves and which may<br />
have led some to ignore the ethical or legal issues or the reputational impact<br />
on the bank.<br />
6.62 The FSA also considered LIBOR rate submissions between September 2008 and<br />
May 2009, amid concerns that they had been adjusted on the instruction of Barclays’<br />
senior management to make the bank appear healthier at the peak of the financial<br />
crisis. We draw no conclusions in relation to these issues, other than that there<br />
appear to have been significant failures of communication, internally and with the<br />
authorities, regarding the bank’s rate submissions.<br />
6.63 We have not been able to assess whether the behaviour illustrated by the much<br />
publicised LIBOR emails reflects a particular trading culture that could extend into<br />
other parts of the investment bank. With current levels of scepticism, the public is<br />
likely to suspect that the problem extends elsewhere. It will be important that<br />
Barclays seriously addresses this possibility and fully investigates other areas where<br />
similar issues might have occurred.<br />
6.64 Barclays cooperated with the regulatory enquiries and was given credit by the<br />
regulators for this. We have been told that Barclays was generally good at responding<br />
to particular issues identified by regulators – but less good at identifying and dealing<br />
with the wider implications of those issues. As Barclays discovered the LIBOR<br />
problem, we believe that it could have moved more quickly to learn any wider<br />
lessons and to review whether there were pricing or trading issues elsewhere across<br />
the bank.<br />
6.65 A number of banks, including Barclays, had raised concerns about the setting of<br />
LIBOR. In the press notice relating to the FSA’s own internal audit report (in March<br />
2013) into the LIBOR submissions issue, it noted that “the information received<br />
should have been better managed” by the FSA and “taking the information<br />
cumulatively the likelihood that lowballing was occurring should have been<br />
considered”. The information included some from Barclays. 115<br />
Looking Forward<br />
6.66 As Barclays, on the back of the Transform Programme, works to improve its values<br />
and culture, and the effectiveness of its systems and controls, it is quite possible that<br />
further historic conduct issues will be discovered. This brings with it the paradox that<br />
current improvements could uncover legacy issues which further damage Barclays’<br />
reputation. We consider this to be an inevitable part of the change process and<br />
Barclays should be quick to handle issues, and not be put off by the specific response<br />
to its early settlement of the LIBOR regulatory actions.<br />
6.67 Interest-only mortgages are an example of the present predicament that banks face<br />
under which long-established products are subsequently reviewed and challenged for<br />
their suitability. The FSA has stated that interest-only mortgages can still be sold<br />
115 Source: FSA internal audit report, 5 March 2013.