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Salz Review - Wall Street Journal

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<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />

58<br />

banks then made the decision to provide for alleged PPI mis-selling claims. Barclays<br />

announced in May 2011 that it would not appeal the court decision.<br />

6.24 We accept that PPI was intrinsically a valuable product for some customers and that<br />

the instances of alleged mis-selling were an industry-wide problem. But we believe<br />

Barclays might have taken too much comfort from this and from the regulatory<br />

involvement with the issues – and as a result was slow to address control failures.<br />

We consider that:<br />

― Given the level of customer complaints from 2005 to 2008, there should have<br />

been more scrutiny of customer suitability;<br />

― The high profitability of PPI should have raised questions as to whether this<br />

was consistent with Barclays’ obligations to customers;<br />

― Barclays was slow to deal with the emerging regulatory concerns;<br />

― Barclays’ PPI sales force incentive schemes aggressively pushed sales,<br />

potentially at the expense of customer suitability, until the schemes were<br />

changed in recent years;<br />

― Controls over the selling process could have been stronger – certain business<br />

units were particularly aggressive, most notably FirstPlus (which ceased<br />

making new loans in 2008), but also the retail bank and Barclaycard; 93<br />

― The culture of the bank had developed into one which at times valued<br />

meeting financial targets more than meeting customer needs.<br />

Industry observation B: Retrospective interpretations<br />

The industry has been vocal in asserting that regulators and others involved in<br />

redress have sometimes developed and adapted their approach over time to<br />

specific conduct issues, ultimately relating to the settlement of customer claims,<br />

to the material disadvantage of the banks. We are not in a position to judge<br />

whether this is a fair viewpoint. On occasions any such change in approach will<br />

no doubt be justified by new information available to the regulators or be a<br />

reaction to how the banks have themselves handled an issue. Effective<br />

regulation, at its best, is based on mutual trust and respect. For this, it will be<br />

important that, wherever possible, banks fully understand how the regulators<br />

intend to approach issues and how any rules will be applied. Certainty is<br />

impossible and consistency on the part of the regulator will, in turn, depend<br />

upon the industry applying regulation in line with its spirit. This will, of course,<br />

be assisted by the efforts of the banks to apply the highest standards of<br />

customer care.<br />

SME Derivatives<br />

6.25 In June 2012, the FSA found that there were serious failings in the way interest rate<br />

hedging products had been sold by Barclays, among other banks, to small and<br />

medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and required the banks to provide redress where<br />

mis-selling had occurred. These derivatives sales had started around 2001, via a joint<br />

93 Telegraph, “Barclays stops loans at FirstPlus”, 8 July 2008.

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