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Salz Review - Wall Street Journal

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61<br />

<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />

basis client money held in sterling money market deposits”. This had happened for<br />

over eight years, between 1 December 2001 and 29 December 2009. Such client<br />

monies were segregated overnight but not on an intra-day basis. The average daily<br />

amount of client money involved increased from £6 million in 2002 to £387 million<br />

in 2009. The highest amount held in the account and at risk at any one time was<br />

£752 million. 99<br />

6.35 Other firms have been fined by the FSA for client money segregation matters – for<br />

instance, JP Morgan (£33.3 million in June 2010). 100 We consider that the Barclays<br />

breach was allowed to continue for too long, but was eventually corrected quickly.<br />

The bank appears to have prioritised business growth over ensuring that the<br />

underlying operational systems and processes were adequate to protect its<br />

customers’ interests.<br />

Transaction Reporting<br />

6.36 In order to detect and investigate suspected market abuse such as insider trading<br />

and market manipulation, the FSA requires firms to submit data of reportable<br />

transactions by close of business on the day after a trade is executed. While reviewing<br />

a suspected incident of market abuse by a third party, the FSA discovered<br />

discrepancies in Barclays’ data, which during a subsequent review of the bank’s<br />

transaction reporting arrangements revealed that it did not have adequate systems<br />

and controls to satisfy the transaction reporting requirements. Over a two-year<br />

period, 57.5 million transactions across all asset classes had been inaccurately<br />

reported, including 17 million transactions where no report had been submitted.<br />

6.37 The FSA consequently fined Barclays Capital Securities Ltd (the subsidiary in which<br />

the breaches occurred) and Barclays Bank PLC (the parent company) £2.45 million<br />

in August 2009, 101 the largest of the six fines the FSA has imposed for failures to<br />

provide accurate transaction reports and for serious weaknesses in systems and<br />

controls in transaction reporting. The FSA remarked that “complete and accurate<br />

transaction reports are an essential component of the FSA’s market monitoring<br />

work. Barclays’ reporting failures could have a damaging impact on our ability to<br />

detect and investigate suspected market abuse. The penalty imposed on Barclays is<br />

significantly higher than previous penalties imposed for transaction reporting errors.<br />

This reflects the serious nature of Barclays’ breaches and is a warning to other firms<br />

that the FSA will not tolerate inadequate systems and controls.” 102<br />

6.38 We consider that this is another example of inadequate systems and controls in a<br />

core area of the bank's business. Causes could include under-investment in relevant<br />

IT systems and inappropriate reliance on manual intervention.<br />

99 FSA, “FSA levies £1.12m fine on Barclays Capital for client money breaches” (FSA/PN/014/2011), 26<br />

January 2011.<br />

100 FSA, “FSA levies largest ever fine of £33.32m on J.P.Morgan Securities Ltd for client money breaches”<br />

(FSA/PN/089/2010), 3 June 2010.<br />

101 FSA, “FSA fines Barclays £2.45m for failures in transaction reporting” (FSA/PN/117/2009), 8<br />

September 2009.<br />

102 Ibid.

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