Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
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61<br />
<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />
An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />
basis client money held in sterling money market deposits”. This had happened for<br />
over eight years, between 1 December 2001 and 29 December 2009. Such client<br />
monies were segregated overnight but not on an intra-day basis. The average daily<br />
amount of client money involved increased from £6 million in 2002 to £387 million<br />
in 2009. The highest amount held in the account and at risk at any one time was<br />
£752 million. 99<br />
6.35 Other firms have been fined by the FSA for client money segregation matters – for<br />
instance, JP Morgan (£33.3 million in June 2010). 100 We consider that the Barclays<br />
breach was allowed to continue for too long, but was eventually corrected quickly.<br />
The bank appears to have prioritised business growth over ensuring that the<br />
underlying operational systems and processes were adequate to protect its<br />
customers’ interests.<br />
Transaction Reporting<br />
6.36 In order to detect and investigate suspected market abuse such as insider trading<br />
and market manipulation, the FSA requires firms to submit data of reportable<br />
transactions by close of business on the day after a trade is executed. While reviewing<br />
a suspected incident of market abuse by a third party, the FSA discovered<br />
discrepancies in Barclays’ data, which during a subsequent review of the bank’s<br />
transaction reporting arrangements revealed that it did not have adequate systems<br />
and controls to satisfy the transaction reporting requirements. Over a two-year<br />
period, 57.5 million transactions across all asset classes had been inaccurately<br />
reported, including 17 million transactions where no report had been submitted.<br />
6.37 The FSA consequently fined Barclays Capital Securities Ltd (the subsidiary in which<br />
the breaches occurred) and Barclays Bank PLC (the parent company) £2.45 million<br />
in August 2009, 101 the largest of the six fines the FSA has imposed for failures to<br />
provide accurate transaction reports and for serious weaknesses in systems and<br />
controls in transaction reporting. The FSA remarked that “complete and accurate<br />
transaction reports are an essential component of the FSA’s market monitoring<br />
work. Barclays’ reporting failures could have a damaging impact on our ability to<br />
detect and investigate suspected market abuse. The penalty imposed on Barclays is<br />
significantly higher than previous penalties imposed for transaction reporting errors.<br />
This reflects the serious nature of Barclays’ breaches and is a warning to other firms<br />
that the FSA will not tolerate inadequate systems and controls.” 102<br />
6.38 We consider that this is another example of inadequate systems and controls in a<br />
core area of the bank's business. Causes could include under-investment in relevant<br />
IT systems and inappropriate reliance on manual intervention.<br />
99 FSA, “FSA levies £1.12m fine on Barclays Capital for client money breaches” (FSA/PN/014/2011), 26<br />
January 2011.<br />
100 FSA, “FSA levies largest ever fine of £33.32m on J.P.Morgan Securities Ltd for client money breaches”<br />
(FSA/PN/089/2010), 3 June 2010.<br />
101 FSA, “FSA fines Barclays £2.45m for failures in transaction reporting” (FSA/PN/117/2009), 8<br />
September 2009.<br />
102 Ibid.