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Salz Review - Wall Street Journal

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<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />

114<br />

Marcus Agius had identified in 2010 or before. But it was the LIBOR crisis in 2012<br />

that gave this subject real priority and urgency.<br />

Risk Oversight<br />

9.64 The division of responsibilities and the coordination of activity between the Barclays<br />

Board and its Board committees requires clarity. As a starting point, the Board itself<br />

must develop clear agreement on the Group’s risk appetite given how fundamental<br />

this is to the bank’s business. It must also be clear as to the allocation of risk<br />

oversight between the Risk, Audit and Citizenship 187 Committees, and also on their<br />

input to the Remuneration Committee.<br />

9.65 We have two primary concerns regarding the way in which the Barclays Board<br />

oversaw risk in recent years. Each may have contributed to problems:<br />

― There was no clear home for Board oversight of operational risk, including<br />

the increasingly important category of conduct risk, although it came within<br />

the formal remit of the Board Risk Committee;<br />

― Reputational risk was not prioritised in the framework of Board decision<br />

making, and lacked formal Board oversight until 2011.<br />

9.66 Setting the Group’s risk appetite for operational risk and monitoring its position<br />

against that appetite was primarily the responsibility of the Board Risk Committee.<br />

Barclays’ 2009 Annual Report 188 explained that “the Board Risk Committee focuses<br />

on risks taken deliberately and overtly, such as credit, market, capital and liquidity<br />

risk, rather than the risks of simply doing business, such as operational risk.”<br />

We have the sense that operational risk was something of an orphan, perhaps<br />

because the risk appetite was less easily capable of being quantified numerically and<br />

managed. Events like LIBOR, non-compliance with sanctions and various mis-selling<br />

allegations, as well as integration, IT and systems issues related to the growth of the<br />

investment bank, demonstrate that financial and reputational damage from<br />

operational failures can be no less severe than that arising from credit and<br />

market risk.<br />

9.67 We are not aware of responsibility for oversight of operational risk being explicitly<br />

passed to any other committee, although we were told that, as is customary, the<br />

Board Audit Committee had the responsibility to review internal controls including<br />

the way in which any control failures affected operational risk. We discuss<br />

operational risk more generally in a Section 12.<br />

9.68 We have seen instances where the reputational impact of events or actions was<br />

greater than anticipated. This suggests to us that there needs to be clear responsibility<br />

for oversight of reputational risk at Board level. This was given to the Citizenship<br />

Committee in 2011 but the Committee met only three times over 2011 and 2012.<br />

It was therefore not well placed to influence the general flow of decisions that could<br />

have involved reputational issues. Before 2011, the Group operated a Brand &<br />

Reputation Committee which, though primarily a management committee, was<br />

187 Recently renamed Board Conduct, Reputation and Operational Risk Committee.<br />

188 Barclays, 2009 Annual Report, March 2010, p. 166.

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