Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
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<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />
An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />
114<br />
Marcus Agius had identified in 2010 or before. But it was the LIBOR crisis in 2012<br />
that gave this subject real priority and urgency.<br />
Risk Oversight<br />
9.64 The division of responsibilities and the coordination of activity between the Barclays<br />
Board and its Board committees requires clarity. As a starting point, the Board itself<br />
must develop clear agreement on the Group’s risk appetite given how fundamental<br />
this is to the bank’s business. It must also be clear as to the allocation of risk<br />
oversight between the Risk, Audit and Citizenship 187 Committees, and also on their<br />
input to the Remuneration Committee.<br />
9.65 We have two primary concerns regarding the way in which the Barclays Board<br />
oversaw risk in recent years. Each may have contributed to problems:<br />
― There was no clear home for Board oversight of operational risk, including<br />
the increasingly important category of conduct risk, although it came within<br />
the formal remit of the Board Risk Committee;<br />
― Reputational risk was not prioritised in the framework of Board decision<br />
making, and lacked formal Board oversight until 2011.<br />
9.66 Setting the Group’s risk appetite for operational risk and monitoring its position<br />
against that appetite was primarily the responsibility of the Board Risk Committee.<br />
Barclays’ 2009 Annual Report 188 explained that “the Board Risk Committee focuses<br />
on risks taken deliberately and overtly, such as credit, market, capital and liquidity<br />
risk, rather than the risks of simply doing business, such as operational risk.”<br />
We have the sense that operational risk was something of an orphan, perhaps<br />
because the risk appetite was less easily capable of being quantified numerically and<br />
managed. Events like LIBOR, non-compliance with sanctions and various mis-selling<br />
allegations, as well as integration, IT and systems issues related to the growth of the<br />
investment bank, demonstrate that financial and reputational damage from<br />
operational failures can be no less severe than that arising from credit and<br />
market risk.<br />
9.67 We are not aware of responsibility for oversight of operational risk being explicitly<br />
passed to any other committee, although we were told that, as is customary, the<br />
Board Audit Committee had the responsibility to review internal controls including<br />
the way in which any control failures affected operational risk. We discuss<br />
operational risk more generally in a Section 12.<br />
9.68 We have seen instances where the reputational impact of events or actions was<br />
greater than anticipated. This suggests to us that there needs to be clear responsibility<br />
for oversight of reputational risk at Board level. This was given to the Citizenship<br />
Committee in 2011 but the Committee met only three times over 2011 and 2012.<br />
It was therefore not well placed to influence the general flow of decisions that could<br />
have involved reputational issues. Before 2011, the Group operated a Brand &<br />
Reputation Committee which, though primarily a management committee, was<br />
187 Recently renamed Board Conduct, Reputation and Operational Risk Committee.<br />
188 Barclays, 2009 Annual Report, March 2010, p. 166.