Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
Salz Review - Wall Street Journal
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43<br />
<strong>Salz</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />
An Independent <strong>Review</strong> of Barclays’ Business Practices<br />
October 2009 and a further sale of warrants worth around £750 million in<br />
November 2012.<br />
5.19 While investors might have preferred to have had the opportunity to participate in a<br />
pre-emptive offer, we see no basis now to criticise the conclusion of Barclays’<br />
management and the Board that, with capital needed to be raised urgently and<br />
considerable uncertainty in the markets, a full pre-emptive offer carried a significant<br />
risk of failure which it was in the bank’s interest to avoid. It is easy to forget the<br />
urgency when looking back now, but the October/November capital raising took<br />
place at a unique time of unpredictability and insecurity for the market and Barclays’<br />
ability to avoid a UK government equity investment was far from inevitable.<br />
The Board’s doubts about the likely strength of support for a fully pre-emptive offer<br />
seem to us legitimate given the poor level of shareholder take-up of the open offer in<br />
July 2008 and of offerings of other banks around that time. However, given the level<br />
of investor dissatisfaction at the decision, there must be a question whether Barclays<br />
could have communicated more effectively with existing shareholders as to its<br />
rationale for the structure of the capital raising which it adopted. In the event, the<br />
relevant shareholder resolutions were passed by over 85% of those voting.<br />
5.20 Barclays disclosed that the “commissions, fees and expenses” for the<br />
October/November 2008 capital raising amounted to £300 million, payable primarily<br />
to Qatar Holding, Challenger and HH Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a<br />
member of the Abu Dhabi royal family, all of whom subscribed to the capital<br />
raising. 61<br />
5.21 Barclays’ most recent public statements refer to:<br />
― Investigations by the FSA and Serious Fraud Office in connection with<br />
certain commercial agreements between Barclays and Qatari interests and<br />
whether these may have related to Barclays capital raisings in June and<br />
November 2008;<br />
― An investigation by the US Department of Justice and US Securities and<br />
Exchange Commission into whether the Group’s relationships with third<br />
parties who assist Barclays to win or retain business are compliant with the<br />
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 62<br />
5.22 In view of the continuing investigations into these capital raisings, we have not<br />
considered issues concerning the sufficiency of disclosure or the commercial<br />
arrangements.<br />
Stress Tests<br />
5.23 In early 2009 the FSA mandated a stress test to assess the resilience of the banking<br />
industry’s capital base in the event of a severe economic downturn. Given the<br />
concerns about Barclays’ valuation of its assets, there was strong market sentiment<br />
that Barclays could fail the test. This was a crucial moment in Barclays’ struggle to<br />
61 Barclays, “Barclays announces Capital Raising”, press release, 31 October 2008.<br />
62 Barclays, 2012 Annual Report, March 2013.