Water Users Association and Irrigation Management - Institute for ...

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face the uncertainties and also to search for solutions where possible. The reasons for better
collective action here can be explained by the Buchanan & Tullock (1965) theory, which
emphasizes that collective action emerges when individuals cannot fulfil their needs
through individual actions and they come together and choose a collective mode of action
where each of its individual members finds it profitable to act collectively rather than
individually. This can be noticed in terms of paying water cess or contributing labor for
O&M or abiding by the rules of the WUA where the individual costs are less than the
benefits out of collective action. The low level of monitoring undertaken and also the low
levels or almost absence of chronic conflict among farmers in the WUA testify to the
stability of the system and is considered by Glick to be "a tribute to the efficiency of the
distribution system" (Glick, 1970). More than any other single factor, the sustainability of
the WUA is ensured because the farmers have enough incentives to participate that have
resulted in sufficient tangible and non-tangible gains. This case clearly demonstrates a
robust and self-governing institution in an agency-managed large irrigation system where
well-specified management functions and assignment of authority along with effective
accountability and incentives for farmer participation exist. Furthermore, arrangements for
timely contlict resolution by the WUA are noteworthy.
Most importantly, the WUA successfully addressed two major issues i.e. allocation of
water and regular maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. This has resulted in efficient
irrigation services at a reasonable cost leading to the satisfaction of farmers. The WUA is
exposed to urban market activities with good roads and connections and the market
penetration has increased the economic returns to irrigated agriculture, and thereby the
incentives of farmers to participate in the WUA. Hence, it challenges Fujita, Hayami &
Kikuchi (1999) point that accesses to markets often decreases interdependence and
therefore might reduce the likelihood of collective action. Although there exists a
legitimate and continuing role for the state, the WUA meets Shepsle's (1989) and Ostrom's
(1994) cri terion of institutional robustness, where the rules have been devised by the
members and modified over time, according to a set of collective-choice and constitutional
rules. The popular notions of obstacles caused by the hierarchical society were proven to be
invalid under conditions of a participatory process of social organization where the farmers
cope with existing social and political pressure along with feudal forces and act collectively
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