Water Users Association and Irrigation Management - Institute for ...
Water Users Association and Irrigation Management - Institute for ...
Water Users Association and Irrigation Management - Institute for ...
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production-function approach has been adopted to detennine the impact of soil salinity <strong>and</strong><br />
waterlogging on yield levels of paddy. Finally, in the third stage, from the estimated<br />
production functions a decomposition exercise has been undertaken to analyze the impact<br />
of changes in inputs <strong>and</strong> the quality of l<strong>and</strong> on the yield variations. Further, logit regression<br />
is employed to analyze the factors that influence the management strategies adopted by<br />
fanners to mitigate the cnvironmental problems.<br />
Theoretical approach <strong>and</strong> conceptual framework<br />
At the macro leveL government may set a regulatory framework, fonnulate policies <strong>and</strong><br />
provide guidelines <strong>for</strong> water resource management; but in tinal analysis it is thc activities of<br />
the individuals that count. <strong>Water</strong> <strong>and</strong> irrigation infrastructure are common pool resources,<br />
due to their low excludability <strong>and</strong> high rivalry. The individual member's attitude <strong>and</strong><br />
behavior in using the water available to the group cannot be excluded. This lowexcludability<br />
stems from the high costs of developing <strong>and</strong> implementing means of<br />
individual regulation, while the rivalry stems from the fact that the consumption of a unit of<br />
the good by one individual makes it unavailable to others. The difticulty of exclusion<br />
reduces individual irrigators' incentives to contribute to the provision of the resource, as<br />
non-contributors benefit equally from the flow without incurring the costs of provision.<br />
Furthennore, the rival aspect of water resources <strong>and</strong> their common pool nature allows free<br />
riders to sustain only a traction of social cost of their actions, thus producing an externality<br />
that results in inefficient use of the resource. It is the combination of these two factors (Iowexcludability<br />
<strong>and</strong> rivalry) that leads to the well-known common pool resource dilemma.<br />
Institutions in the fonn of collective action may be one way in which societies can<br />
overcome this dilemma.<br />
There has been much discussion of the logic of collective action 2 during the last three<br />
decades (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1992). <strong>Water</strong> resources management is an especially<br />
enlightening illustration of the practical <strong>and</strong> theoretical problems of collective action. Some<br />
have applied this reasoning directly to the problem of irrigation organization (Freeman &<br />
2 Collective action is used to describe the process <strong>and</strong> consequences of individual decisions to voluntary coordinated<br />
behavior. All cases of voluntary collaborative decision-making can be understood as collective<br />
action.<br />
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