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Water Users Association and Irrigation Management - Institute for ...

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attempting to achieve collective benefits. The underlying issue in these concepts is the free<br />

rider problem. Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others<br />

provide, cach person is motivated not to contribute to the joint ef<strong>for</strong>t, but to free ride on the<br />

ef<strong>for</strong>ts of others. If all the farmers choose to free ride, the collective benefit will not he<br />

produced. The temptation to free ride may dominate the decision process, <strong>and</strong> thus all will<br />

end up where no one wanted to be. Alternatively, some may provide while others free ride,<br />

leading to less than the optimal level of provision of the collective benefit.<br />

Against this backdrop, the study tries to identify the factors underlying the issues of<br />

collective action in the selected comm<strong>and</strong> area. Our enquiry into the nature of the collective<br />

action or the lack of it begins at the outlet level where water is appropriated as a common<br />

property. Once it is received as a common property, the users within the comm<strong>and</strong> area<br />

have to allocate the water amongst them according to the localization pattern. We apply the<br />

principles of collective action in detail to two different situations discussed below.<br />

1. The case of Gundur where WUA is functioning<br />

In Gundur, the presence of WUA provided a useful laboratory <strong>for</strong> the study of collective<br />

action. An attempt is made to identify the incentives of independent individuals to work<br />

collectively <strong>and</strong> the conditions under which the users are likely to come together <strong>and</strong> work<br />

etlectively. Further, the conditions under which collective action emerges, become<br />

etlective, <strong>and</strong> is sustained over time are explored.<br />

2. The case of Hagedal where there is no WUA<br />

In Hagedal, the people never felt the need <strong>for</strong> collective action. Even an in<strong>for</strong>mal kind of<br />

collective ef<strong>for</strong>t is sparse. An attempt is made to explore the local <strong>and</strong> external factors,<br />

which affects individual incentives to participate in collective etTorts <strong>and</strong> why associations<br />

are viewed as constraints that individuals place on themselves.<br />

The conceptual framework <strong>for</strong> the study can there<strong>for</strong>e be illustrated as in the following<br />

figure:<br />

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