Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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The corporate world also has classification systems. Each company has its own rules for the protection of information depending upon its sensitivity level to intellectual property, business strategy, and other similar areas. In many respects, the corporate classification system follows the federal government system. As an example, there might be three levels of information control within a corporation where the highest is limited and cannot be released outside of the company. Proprietary information can be released but only to those individuals and companies bound by a signed nondisclosure agreement. Finally, any information not covered by the above can be released outside the company within the restrictions placed by the federal government. In addition, International Traffic in Arms Regulations [89] controlled information, although unclassified and nonproprietary, must still be controlled to prevent disclosure to foreign nationals unless an appropriate export license has been obtained. 6.3.3 Comparison of the Two Policy Systems. It is clear the FAA and civil aviation are concerned about airplane safety and so they define airborne software in terms of the possible safety affects of software failure conditions. The Federal Government, which includes the DoD, is concerned about protection of sensitive information and programs. It defines its software systems in terms of the impact of that software upon the protection of sensitive information and programs. Although the focus on what is being protected against is entirely different between these two policy systems, the intent of the protection mechanisms are similar. Both enforce restrictions on how software operates within its system context. Both are also concerned with the impact of protection mechanisms and the consequences of possible failure affects. Both define their assurance system in terms of the worst-case affects of failure conditions. Coincidentally, both assurance systems are also remarkably similar to each other when viewed at a high level of abstraction, as shown in table 2. Table 2. Comparison of Safety Levels to Security Classifications Safety Level A (catastrophic condition) Level B (hazardous/severe-major condition) Level C (major condition) Level D (minor condition) Level E (no-effect condition) Security Top Secret (exceptionally grave damage) Secret (serious damage) Confidential (damage) Sensitive but Unclassified (could adversely affect) Unclassified (no effect) Therefore, although the civil aviation and federal government systems are distinct systems from each other and are oriented around very different issues, they nevertheless share important attributes. Additional similarities and differences between the two systems include the following: • Only the security side is concerned with confidentiality issues—this issue is briefly discussed in section 6.1.4. 86
• Both safety and security are concerned with integrity issues. Once the programs and data are certified to be correct and operating correctly, any unauthorized changes could result in anomalous behavior. If a software item is evaluated to be at Level E, this unauthorized modification may only be a nuisance at worse. However, as analogous to highly sensitive federal government information, an unauthorized modification to a Level A- or B-rated software may have serious or disastrous results. • Both safety and security are concerned with availability. If flight-critical software on an aircraft is not available when needed, catastrophic results can occur. Likewise, if highly critical and time-sensitive information owned by the federal government is not available, the latest information may not be available during mission planning, potentially resulting in loss of life. • Both safety and security should be concerned with authentication and authorization. Without knowledge of who is attempting to access the software or data, modifications could be made by unauthorized personnel. If malicious, the unauthorized changes could, potentially, cause catastrophic results. • Nonrepudiation is predominately in the security domain. From a security point of view, nonrepudiation provides the capability to ensure that any actions cannot be later denied (e.g., ensures the validity of audit information). In conclusion, safety and security, although they have some differences in protection requirements, also have many similar requirements. The levels defining the criticality of the software and data in both domains have parallels that can help in determining the safety of onboard networks. 6.4 BIBA INTEGRITY MODEL AND BELL-LAPADULA CONFIDENTIALITY MODEL ARE DIRECT ANALOGS. If the FAA were to adopt the Biba Integrity Model for ensuring the safety of networked airborne and NAS systems in accordance with existing DO-178B and ARP 4754 safety policies, then the resulting system could look very much like the current DoD system (see section 5.2). This similarity is directly due to the Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality and Biba Integrity Models being a direct analog of each other, built upon the same state machine concepts. The prime differences would be: • The FAA system is based upon FAA safety policies, while the DoD system is based upon DoD confidentiality policies. • The mandatory policies of the Biba Integrity Model are the direct inverse of the mandatory policies of the Bell-LaPadula Model (see figure 26). The affects of the two models are directly parallel. However, the fact that both the resulting FAA and DoD systems contain a five-level assurance system is not an artifact of either the Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality or the Biba Integrity Models. It rather reflects the coincidence 87
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
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Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
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Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
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Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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