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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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unless, of course, the firewall has established a reverse proxy that is equipped to handle this type<br />

of threat. Attackers can similarly control what is happen<strong>in</strong>g on devices with<strong>in</strong> the firewall by<br />

communicat<strong>in</strong>g with the cracked device via HTTP (port 80), a protocol that is rarely blocked by<br />

any firewall.<br />

Routers have similar vulnerabilities to end-systems except that they are more likely than endsystems<br />

to be identified by traceroute and they usually have substantially fewer resident<br />

application daemons for the attacker to potentially exploit.<br />

Attackers often attack routers through SNMP. There are many security problems with SNMP<br />

(see section 4.6). These systems are particularly vulnerable if older versions of SNMP (i.e.,<br />

SNMPv1 or SNMPv2) are be<strong>in</strong>g used or if the default SNMP community names have not been<br />

altered or removed from the network device previous to deployment (e.g., “public,” “write,”<br />

“user” are common default SNMP account names on routers, usually without any associated<br />

password protections). Similar vulnerabilities exist for the default accounts and ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />

accounts that come on most network<strong>in</strong>g devices. In all other respects, the threats and exploits<br />

affect<strong>in</strong>g network devices such as routers are the same as those affect<strong>in</strong>g computers, except that<br />

the network devices traditionally have substantially fewer applications, and therefore less<br />

vulnerability for attackers to exploit.<br />

A.3 AVAILABILITY ATTACKS.<br />

These attacks do not seek to take over devices or network systems, but rather seek to make the<br />

network systems support<strong>in</strong>g devices become <strong>in</strong>effectual.<br />

A number of controls have been proposed to thwart specific classes of availability attacks. Some<br />

of these controls have been demonstrated <strong>in</strong> laboratory environments. However, other than<br />

secur<strong>in</strong>g the data communications protocols themselves (see section 4.5), few if any of these<br />

mechanisms have yet been demonstrated to be effective with<strong>in</strong> actual operational network<br />

deployments. Thus, effective defenses aga<strong>in</strong>st many classes of availability attacks are not yet<br />

available with<strong>in</strong> today’s best current practices.<br />

A-13

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