Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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• IBM’s SNA evolved many mechanisms to be conveyed over TCP/IP transports (e.g., TN3270, 80d5 Ethernet, Multi-protocol Transport Networking, and the IBM AnyNet product line). • Xerox XNS was gradually replaced by TCP/IP-based systems. Figure 13 shows the protocol stack when TCP/IP family protocols are used to provide nearubiquitous end-to-end communications to legacy environments (e.g., RFC 1006). Because the IP protocol can be conveyed over an extensive array of different media types, including many existing legacy systems (ultra high frequency (UHF), very high frequency (VHF), etc.), this approach directly leverages previous investments. Legacy Protocol Applications TCP/IP Transport (SCTP, UDP, or TCP) Internet Protocol (IP) Appropriate Media or Signals in Space Figure 13. Internet Protocol Stack to Convey Legacy Protocols Despite these benefits, IP-based communications may not be able to satisfy all legacy application requirements. Specifically, applications with extreme latency or jitter sensitivity may not be able to migrate to TCP/IP family transports despite the QoS improvements of IP systems. Systems that cannot evolve to use IP can integrate within the larger system as leaf nodes or edge subnets via protocol translation gateways to the IP infrastructure as is shown in figure 12. 4.8 IDENTITY PROBLEM. IP has two major variants: IPv4 is the historic version of IP that currently populates the majority of the worldwide Internet infrastructure today. IPv6 improves upon IPv4’s scaling properties and is gradually replacing IPv4 worldwide. IP deployments may simultaneously support both IPv4 and IPv6. The value of a specific IPv4 address is determined by the IP network topology location of its network interface in general. A multihomed IPv4 device, therefore, will have as many different IPv4 addresses as it has network interfaces, with one unique IPv4 address per network interface. This is because each network interface is located in a different network location within the IP routing topology. Specifically, the IP address value indicates the specific subnetwork to which that interface attaches, as well as the grouping of that interface within the other aggregations of the IP topology hierarchy. 50
Simultaneously, IP addresses are also used to identify application layer entities located within the device that hosts them. Therefore, IP addresses are semantically overloaded by simultaneously indicating two different semantic notions: routing topology location and device identity. The overloading of these very different semantic notions into the same address value results in what is known as the “IP Identity Problem.” The identity problem may become manifested whenever a device physically moves within the routing topology (e.g., when aircraft move relative to ground-based infrastructures). Mobility can cause a conflict between the two semantic notions; because the moving entity has changed its network location, it is normally expected to readdress its network interfaces to reflect their new topological location. But if that is done, how can entities remote to that device authoritatively know that the device previously identified as having IP address X is the same device that now has IP address Y? IPv6 addresses differ from IPv4 addresses in that each IPv6 network interface may simultaneously have multiple different IPv6 addresses, each with a potentially different network topology significance. IPv6 systems also support assigning unique IPv6 addresses to each application within that device. Consequently, IPv6 devices can support logical networks internal to that device itself, with each application supported by that device potentially having its own IPv6 address. By contrast, IPv4 systems are limited to referring to their applications solely via the port address field within the transport layer’s protocol header (e.g., UDP, TCP, stream control transmission protocol). Both IPv4 and IPv6 similarly share the IP identity problem, though its affects somewhat differ between the two protocol systems. Mechanisms to mitigate the IP identity problem are outside of the scope of this study. The point of this discussion is that the worldwide civil aviation network infrastructure needs to devise a common mechanism by which the identity of networked elements is established. This means defining a common aeronautical solution for the IP identity problem for aircraft. If this is not done, then serious security vulnerabilities can arise whenever aircraft transition between system elements having dissimilar identity approaches. 4.9 INTEGRATED OR COOPERATING SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS. The previous section discussed some of the issues related to creating a network infrastructure that links together two or more different protocol families. Section 4.8 mentioned the fact that TCP/IP systems have a weakness that is known as “The Identity Problem” that OSI systems do not share. The purpose of this section is to mention that the defense-in-depth provisions (see section 5.1) that are used to protect infrastructures rely on a coherent mechanism within that infrastructure for handling identity, authentication, and authorization. Should any of these elements not be handled in a consistent manner, then the infrastructure is subject to vulnerabilities that attackers can leverage to damage that infrastructure and potentially harm its safety attributes. Each protocol family has its own mechanism for establishing identity. Protocol gateway translators will need to map between these different systems to successfully enable 51
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
Page 15 and 16: This report states that the primary
Page 17 and 18: 1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
Page 19 and 20: protocol (IP)-based communications.
Page 21 and 22: of linking aircraft-resident system
Page 23 and 24: Industry and governments are extrem
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27 and 28: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 29 and 30: • The security viability of curre
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
Page 75 and 76: Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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