13.09.2014 Views

Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

software items. Is there a security model or theory that could be discovered to<br />

authoritatively address this issue so that highly assured software could be def<strong>in</strong>itively<br />

created with<strong>in</strong> networked environments?<br />

• Industry has experience creat<strong>in</strong>g Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model, HAGs. However,<br />

there is little or no experience creat<strong>in</strong>g Biba Integrity Model HAGs. Therefore, there is a<br />

need to study and articulate the controls needed with<strong>in</strong> Biba Integrity Model HAGs. This<br />

study should dist<strong>in</strong>guish the differences (if any) between Biba Integrity Model HAG<br />

technology and Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model HAG technology.<br />

• What are the mechanisms that will <strong>in</strong>tegrate DoD and <strong>FAA</strong> certification processes and<br />

procedures? Is it possible to create a common certification system that reliably addresses<br />

safety <strong>in</strong> <strong>FAA</strong> environments and security <strong>in</strong> DoD environments, and both safety and<br />

security <strong>in</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t certification environments?<br />

• Should Level D software systems be treated as Requirement 1 systems and organized <strong>in</strong>to<br />

VPN enclaves as this study currently states (see section 8.2), or should they rather<br />

become Requirement 2 systems and not be enclaved <strong>in</strong>to network partitions (VPNs) such<br />

as Level E systems?<br />

12. REFERENCES.<br />

1. ARP 4754, “Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex <strong>Aircraft</strong><br />

Systems,” 1996, SAE International, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-<br />

0001.<br />

2. ARP 4761, “Guidel<strong>in</strong>es and Methods for Conduct<strong>in</strong>g the Safety Assessment Process on<br />

Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment,” 1996, SAE International, 400 Commonwealth<br />

Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001.<br />

3. 14 CFR 23.1309, Equipment, systems, and <strong>in</strong>stallations, Revised January 1, 2006.<br />

4. 14 CFR 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and <strong>in</strong>stallations, Revised January 1, 2006.<br />

5. RTCA/DO-178B, “Software Considerations <strong>in</strong> Airborne Systems and Equipment<br />

Certification,” December 1, 1992, Prepared by SC-167.<br />

6. RTCA/DO-254, “Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware,” April<br />

19, 2000, Prepared by SC-180.<br />

7. Knight, J., “Software Challenges <strong>in</strong> Aviation Systems,” NASA Grant number NAG-1-<br />

2290, 2002. http://dependability.cs.virg<strong>in</strong>ia.edu/publications/safecomp.2002.pdf<br />

8. <strong>FAA</strong> Advisory Circular 120-76A, “Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for the Certification, Airworth<strong>in</strong>ess, and<br />

Operational Approval of Electronic Flight Bag Comput<strong>in</strong>g Devices,” March 17, 2003.<br />

148

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!