Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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permits one to instruct an FTP service on another machine to send files to an FTP service on a third machine, thereby cloaking the command origin—a very useful tool for attackers to hide the origin of attacks. A.1.4 OPERATING SYSTEM DETECTION. A second objective of port scanning is to determine the OS of that machine. Knowing the target machine’s OS is invaluable in the vulnerability-mapping phase that immediately precedes launching exploits to attempt to actually take over the remote machine (see discussion about the cracking devices in section A.2). The OS identity can be learned from mechanisms such as banner grabbing; 10 however, the most useful approaches use stack fingerprinting. Tools such as nmap, cheops, tkined, and queso are commonly used to do stack fingerprinting to quickly ascertain what the target machine’s OS is, including the actual version of the OS implementation, with a high degree of probability. These tools leverage techniques such as the FIN probe (see RFC 793), the Bogus Flag probe, initial sequence number sampling, don’tfragment-bit monitoring, TCP initial window size, ACK value, ICMP error message quenching (see RFC 1812), ICMP message quoting, ICMP error message echoing integrity, type of service for “ICMP port unreachable” messages, fragmentation handling, and other TCP options (see RFC 1323) to make their calculations. Specifically, the RFCs that define TCP specify how a system should respond during connection initiation. However, they do not define how the system should respond to the various illegal combinations of TCP code bits. Rather, each implementation responds somewhat differently to the same set of illegal flags or finite state machine protocol violations. These differences provide a basis for these hacker tools to determine, with a high degree of probability, exactly what OS they are remotely accessing. A.1.5 ENUMERATION. Once the attacker has identified the OS of the target machine to crack, the attacker will want to learn the valid accounts or exported resource names of that system. This process is known as enumeration. The tools and approaches for accomplishing enumeration are largely a function of the target OS to be cracked. The default configuration of Microsoft Windows machines is particularly vulnerable for enumeration, though other machines are also vulnerable. For example, within Unix devices, the Sun ONC services (e.g., Sun remote procedure call (RPC), network information system, and network file system (NFS)) are particularly vulnerable to enumeration. The finger utility is perhaps the oldest way to do enumeration on Unix systems. Similarly, r- commands such as rusers and rwho also provide enumeration services. Enumeration can also occur via SMTP. The SMTP VRFY command confirms the names of valid users and the EXPN command reveals the actual delivery addresses of aliases and mailing lists. 10 Services such as FTP, Telnet, SMTP, HTTP, POP3, IMAP4, and others frequently identify the operating system of their hosting machine. This identification is then leveraged by the attacker to focus the attack upon known weaknesses of that OS, often by using automated attack mechanisms. A-5
The simple network management protocol (SNMP, see RFC 3413) also has a weakness in regard to enumeration. Many SNMP implementations readily enumerate the users of the host machine upon request. For example, the popular Unix NET-SNMP implementation of SNMP provides a management information base that is filled with a huge amount of information concerning the host OS, the IP, and mission assurance category addresses used by that machine, the network and route information of the machine’s interfaces, and the active ports it is listening to. The book “Hacking Linux Exposed Second Edition” (see page 158 of reference A-9) outlines how a single command “snmpwalk appropriate_DNS_address public” can retrieve all of this valuable information. Another common exploit is to grab the /etc/password file from a target Unix machine. At this early stage of cracking preparation, this is usually done by using the TFTP (port UDP/69) to directly access (and copy) this file containing the list of the OS and user accounts on that platform. Unfortunately, virtually all generic OSs have at least one well-known account that is usually present. Attackers repeatedly leverage this fact. There are many other ways to gain system permissions on these machines (see section A.2). Several ports, including ports 111 (Sun RPC) and 32771 (FileNet RMI), also directly provide enumeration services that are exploited by hacker tools. A.2 CRACKING DEVICES. Because Unix devices are generally considered to be among the more difficult of the generic COTS OSs to crack (i.e., to take over via successful exploits), this section will solely discuss cracking Unix devices. Similar approaches can be used to crack other generic host OSs devices, such as Microsoft Windows or Apple Macintosh systems, as well as the special-purpose OSs used by routers. A.2.1 ROOT ACCOUNT. Most Unix systems have a root account that provides complete access to all functionalities and services within the OS. Many exploits consist of breaking the root password. Once the attacker has learned the root password, the attacker has effectively taken over that device. For this reason, most Unix systems have been configured to not permit remote root accesses, but rather require the administrator first log into the system via a user account and then subsequently use the Unix su command to become root. (This latter practice also enables the log files to identify the identity of the root user, which otherwise would not be known.) For this reason, many exploits first seek to break a user account and then break the root account. A.2.2 USER ACCOUNTS. Both root and user accounts can be broken through brute force mechanisms, data driven attacks, back channels, and social engineering attacks. Brute force mechanisms exist because weak and default passwords are historically the easiest mechanism to compromise Unix systems. Brute A-6
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
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