Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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exist to perform these network enumeration functions 6 . Of particular note is Cheops-ng 7 , a link for open source software that maps and monitors a network. A.1.3 SCANNING. Once the larger network environment has been identified, potential targets within that environment are scanned. The goal here is to learn useful information such as specific user names and phone numbers; IP address ranges; and the identities of DNS servers, Web servers, document/file repositories, and e-mail servers within the domain. The attacker also seeks to “rattle doors and check windows” to identify preferential attack points. During the scanning phase, an explicit goal is to learn what systems are alive and reachable from wherever the attacker is located. Tools used include war-dialers, ping sweeps, port scans, and automated hacker discovery tools. War dialing refers to using automated tools 8 to call all of an organization’s telephone numbers to enumerate and identify the repeat dial tones and modems that are supported by that organization. Ping sweeps systematically send Internet control message protocol (ICMP) (see request for comment (RFC) 791) Echo packets to systematically ping every IP address within a specified range of addresses to determine which active addresses can be reached from the attacking location. Tools like fping and shell scripts with gping are commonly used to conduct ping sweeps from Unix ® devices and pinger, WS_PingProPack and other tools, such as Netscan, are available for Microsoft ® Windows ® devices. Because of this, firewalls and border routers need to be configured to block all incoming ICMP traffic so that ping sweeps originating outside of the autonomous system (AS) cannot penetrate inside that networked environment. Should a device be reachable via ICMP Echo packets, then the attacker can learn a great deal about that device merely by sending ICMP packets to it. For example, icmpquery and icmpush are tools that the attacker can use to learn the current time on the system (ICMP type 13 message) or the device’s netmask value (ICMP type 17 message). The former tells the time zone where the device is deployed, and the latter helps the attacker learn important information about how the subnetwork is configured where the target device is deployed. Because of the growing prevalence of ICMP blocking (e.g., hopefully at firewalls and border routers), attackers have resorted to doing port scans at the transport layer instead of ping sweeps at the network layer. Tools such as nmap (using the (-PT) option 9 ) and hping have automated port scanning capabilities. Because few, if any, firewalls filter hypertext transfer protocol 6 see http://www.samspade.org/, http://www.network-tools.com/, http://www.cotse.com/iptools.html, http://www.securityspace.com/sspace/index.html, http://crypto.yashy.com/, https://grc.com/x/ne.dll?bh0bkyd2, and others. 7 see http://cheops-ng.sourceforge.net/ 8 e.g., THC-Scan 2.0; see http://freeworld.thc.org/thc-scan/ 9 The -PT option means invoking nmap on the operating system’s command line as “nmap –PT”. This means that nmap will execute using its P and the T directives, which will change its execution behavior to do what those options signify. A-3
(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scans searching for reachable active devices are increasingly targeting Port 80 as a mechanism for defeating intermediate firewalls. Several types of port scanning approaches exist to exploit weaknesses within the Internet’s historic Transport Layer Protocols (i.e., TCP and UDP) to learn information about remote systems from transport layer responses, and these types include: • The transmission control protocol (TCP) connect scan (i.e., connects to the target port by completing the three-way TCP handshake: SYN, SYN/ACK, and ACK). • The TCP SYN scan (i.e., only partially connects to the port—enough so that it knows that the port is there and is active). • TCP FIN scan (sends FIN packets to the target port, i.e., see RFC 793). • TCP Xmas tree scan (Sends FIN, URG, and PUSH packets to the target port). • The TCP Null scan (the technique turns off all flags. Based upon RFC 793, the target system should respond by sending back a RST for all closed ports). • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) scan (that is looking for an ICMP port unreachable message—if no such reply, then the port is open). Once it is determined that an active device is reachable, the attacker may want to scan the target device to discover what services it provides. The strobe, sc, netcat, portpro, portscan, nmap, and udp_scan tools are very useful for doing this. (Note: the latter was an element within “SATAN,” which has subsequently been updated to become “SARA” and “SAINT.”) Nmap is perhaps the most powerful of these tools since it performs many other functions and also provides decoy capabilities within its scans. Target Unix systems may support port 113, making them vulnerable to ident scanning (see RFC 1413). In such systems, queries to port 113 will reveal all of the active ports within that system, the protocol (TCP and UDP) being used by that port, the service using that port (i.e., the identity of the application layer daemon), and the owner (e.g., root) of the daemon that is listening on that port. All of this information is very useful to an attacker. Many other scanning attacks and exploits exist, including the file transfer protocol (FTP) bounce attack, which leverages the inherent security vulnerabilities of FTP to post virtually untraceable volumes of documents (e.g., mail and news) onto a third site, potentially filling up the disks of that third site, thereby creating a denial of service (DoS) attack. All other IP Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) services (as well as the Unix r- services) were similarly designed for trusted environments and are therefore similarly characterized by having ineffective security. The ARPA services include FTP (RFC 2228), trivial file transfer protocol (TFTP) (RFC 1782), Telnet (RFC 854), and SMTP (RFC 1652). For example, SMTP (port 25, i.e., Internet Electronic Mail) is so completely barefoot that one can readily spoof any aspect of the SMTP electronic mail header from one’s own machine’s port 25. However, the FTP is unique in that it A-4
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179: information found within these data
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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