Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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the bottom network system. However, figure 27 can also be interpreted as showing a network having the same ubiquitous physical media subdivided into logically different network elements. In the latter case, the top left, top right, and bottom all use the same physical media. In this case, different logical network systems, each having effective network security and isolation through protocol encapsulation, have been created from the same physical system. This latter observation is directly applicable to aircraft systems sharing a common LAN system. That is, COMSEC and VPN techniques permit the creation of partitioned network systems even when sharing a common physical network. This study recommends using the Biba Integrity Model to extend current FAA policies into arbitrarily complex networked environments because it is a formal model on the par with the DoD’s Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model and also because it creates structures that are the direct analog of the Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model. Other security models are also available, including other integrity models (e.g., the Clark-Wilson Integrity Model). Similarly, the FAA could invent a security model of its own, including performing the necessary mathematical proofs. Any of these are valid alternatives for the FAA to consider. What is not a valid alternative is to attempt to extend ARP 4754 into networked environments without using a viable formal mathematical model (e.g., a security model) of some sort. Any such extension would necessarily be ad hoc and produce results that cannot be trusted to be safe. 6.5 RELATING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS TO THE CC. The exemplar network architecture described in section 8.3 relies upon security controls (e.g., firewall, packet filter, ASBR, VPN encapsulation gateways, and HAGs) to provide security protections for the networked system so that the resulting system is assured to operate at a specific safety level. Section 6.4 explained that airborne networks operate at specific safety levels as defined by FAA policy (e.g., DO-178B and ARP 4574) and enforced by the Biba Integrity Model. Therefore, for certification purposes, the integrity of these security controls must be mapped to the appropriate DO-178B safety level. This implies that these security controls can be evaluated in terms of specific DO-178B safety level assurances for the Biba Integrity Model provisions to be viable. This section discusses this issue. The FAA has sponsored a growing body of work evaluating common security and safety processes and systems [41 and 72, 73, and 76]. This issue directly impacts aircraft that need to be dual certified by both the FAA (for safety) and DoD (e.g., the U.S. Air Force; for security). However, this issue is also of a more generic interest. For example, the DoD, in addition to defining their information systems in accordance with security (i.e., confidentiality in particular) constructs, is also concerned with safety issues, which are defined in terms of MIL-STD-882D [90]. MIL-STD-882D shares many similarities with existing civil aviation concepts including a similar safety five-level classification system. Although safety and security are very distinct concepts, they share some common attributes that permit them to be compared (and equated) in several different ways. For example, the FAA and the DoD have created comparable certification environments having similar concepts of assurance. Both safety and security also have similar integrity attributes that may be leveraged 90
in a Biba Integrity Model environment to provide a mechanism to relate otherwise dissimilar safety and security concepts. Both approaches will be considered in this section. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8500.2 Enclosure 4 [91] provides specific guidance to DoD systems on how to identify specific CC (security) protection profiles. While there are many details associated with this process, the issues examined in DoDI 8500.2 Enclosure 4 are particularly relevant for FAA consideration. This is because while the DoD itself is primarily oriented upon confidentiality issues, which have little or no safety consequence, Enclosure 4 focuses on availability and integrity, which are the security concepts that are the most centrally relevant to airborne safety in networked environments (see section 6.1). For example, “the FAA often considers data integrity and availability among the most important” security services (quoted from page 1 of reference 20). The following are direct quotations from DoDI 8500.2 Enclosure 4: “The IA Controls provided in enclosure 4 of this Instruction are distinguished from Common Criteria security functional requirements in that they apply to the definition, configuration, operation, interconnection, and disposal of DoD information systems. They form a management framework for the allocation, monitoring, and regulation of IA resources that is consistent with Federal guidance provided in OMB A-130 [see [92]]. In contrast, Common Criteria security functional requirements apply only to IA & IA-enabled IT products that are incorporated into DoD information systems. They form an engineering language and method for specifying the security features of individual IT products, and for evaluating the security features of those products in a common way that can be accepted by all.” (Quoted from E3.4.3 of reference 91.) “This enclosure [i.e., Enclosure 4 within [91]] establishes a baseline level of information assurance for all DoD information systems through the assignment of specific IA Controls to each system. Assignment is made according to mission assurance category and confidentiality level. Mission assurance category (MAC) I systems require high integrity and high availability, MAC II systems require high integrity and medium availability, and MAC III systems require basic integrity and availability. Confidentiality levels are determined by whether the system processes classified, sensitive, or public information. Mission assurance categories and confidentiality levels are independent, that is a MAC I system may process public information and a MAC III system may process classified information. The nine combinations of mission assurance category and confidentiality level establish nine baseline IA levels that may coexist within the GIG. See Table E4.T2. These baseline levels are achieved by applying the specified set of IA Controls in a comprehensive IA program that includes acquisition, proper security engineering, connection management, and IA administration as described in enclosure 3 of this Instruction.” (Quoted from E4.1.1 of reference 91.) The DoDI 8500.2 Enclosure 4 MAC is defined by the intersection of integrity and availability (the MAC level) and DoD security classifications (the confidentiality attribute for each MAC 91
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 55 and 56: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 57 and 58: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
Page 145 and 146: environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
Page 151 and 152: approach is to keep the log informa
Page 153 and 154: 11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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