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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Figure 31 shows how the recommended architecture addresses many of the network risks that<br />

were previously discussed <strong>in</strong> section 4.<br />

Securely Limits<br />

Threat Environment:<br />

Controls population<br />

that can access this<br />

Network to that VPN<br />

population only. Other<br />

VPNs have different<br />

address and name<br />

spaces. Each VPN<br />

securely partitions<br />

the network.<br />

VPNs and their Items are<br />

difficult to attack except by<br />

<strong>in</strong>sert<strong>in</strong>g a “man <strong>in</strong> the middle”,<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g compromis<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

Encapsulation Gateways.<br />

Encapsulat<strong>in</strong>g Gateway policy<br />

together with the Firewall and<br />

Packet Filter policies help<br />

protect VPNs from be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

vulnerable to attack.<br />

Provides Airplane network<br />

perimeter defense.<br />

Virtual Private Network<br />

Virtual Private Network<br />

Virtual Private Network<br />

Virtual Private Network<br />

<strong>Aircraft</strong> Control<br />

Firewal<br />

Level D SW<br />

Level B SW<br />

Level A SW<br />

Passenger Network<br />

Passenger<br />

1<br />

Level C SW<br />

Route<br />

Encapsulation System<br />

Passenger<br />

2<br />

Level D SW<br />

Level C SW<br />

Level B SW<br />

Level A SW<br />

High-Assurance LAN<br />

Packet Filter<br />

High-Assurance LAN<br />

Passenger<br />

N<br />

<strong>Aircraft</strong><br />

Ideally needs virtual l<strong>in</strong>k<br />

capability to provide<br />

physical layer connectivity<br />

that duplicates the VPN<br />

Connectivity limitations<br />

for Defense <strong>in</strong> Depth<br />

protection.<br />

QoS and network<br />

assurance that<br />

passengers cannot<br />

address, access, or<br />

Conduct DoS <strong>in</strong> the<br />

aircraft LAN<br />

Separate LAN for<br />

passengers so<br />

they cannot bypass<br />

the packet filter.<br />

Configured so that only<br />

network management or<br />

IDS devices can send<br />

packets hav<strong>in</strong>g the router as<br />

the IP dest<strong>in</strong>ation address.<br />

SW = Software<br />

Figure 31. How Design Addresses Network Risks<br />

107

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