Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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the minimal subset of security controls that have been identified by this study: VPN encapsulation, packet filter, firewall, ASBR, high-assurance LAN, and QoS. 7. Existing airborne system assurance processes need to be extended to recognize that networks are a complex integrated system with unique attributes. For example, ARP 4754 processes need to recognize that networks are potentially hostile environments and that humans are a constituent element within networked systems. Human access to networks should not be solely equated to the humans who are authorized to access airborne networks. Rather, it should also consider individuals who are only authorized to access remote networks to which the airborne network is indirectly linked. If airborne networks are directly or indirectly connected to the Internet, this means that over one billion people can theoretically potentially access airborne networks. Consequently, the processes need to be extended to address possible network attack threats upon the integrity and availability of the system and its items. This requires an assured software download process for airborne software using FIPS 186 (i.e., the U.S. Federal DSS [81]). A secure mechanism that automatically verifies the continued integrity of deployed airborne software items within airborne networks is also needed. 8. It is entirely appropriate to use CRCs as polynomial codes to assist in transmission bit error detection and correction across networks and data buses. However, it is inappropriate (and risky) to use CRCs for software identity and integrity protections within networked environments. Rather, document and code-signing mechanisms conforming to U.S. Federal DSS (FIPS 186, [81]) need to be used instead. 9. The networks of the NAS and the worldwide ground networks that communicate with airborne networks need to be designed with an architecture and design that is consistent with that used by airborne networks if the security and safety provisions of airborne networks are to be preserved. Specifically, ground-based entities that communicate with items or systems located within airborne network partitions (i.e., VPN enclaves) must themselves be within the same VPN enclave network partition as the airborne systems with which they communicate. 10. Items and systems that have been assured for stand-alone system deployments should be reassured whenever they are deployed within networked environments in accordance with extended airborne system assurance processes that support network deployments. Former assurance results must be reassured (revalidated and reverified) on an entity-byentity basis before the device or software component is deployed in networked environments. 11. Larger software implementations (i.e., large numbers of lines of code) pose certification challenges for networked environments because of potential vulnerabilities to attack caused by (possible) latent software bugs. Large software programs or applications are more vulnerable in the general case because their large size increases the probability of latent blemishes within the code that can be exploited by network attacks. 140
12. COTS computer systems cannot be adequately secured within large network environments, in general, because their security controls cannot be trusted to perform as intended when attacked. These devices contain potential vulnerabilities potentially affecting security and safety of other networked entities whenever they are deployed within large networks. COTS computer systems, and the applications they support, cannot be high assurance. The following are the recommendations of this study (see section 8.3 for a generic safety and security design implementing these recommendations and safety requirements). 1. Existing ARP 4574, ARP 4761, DO-178B, and DO-254 assurance guidance processes be extended into network environments by using the Biba Integrity Model framework to define network safety and security assurance concepts. 2. The Biba Integrity Model be implemented solely within the context of existing FAA safety processes. This results in airborne network systems being organized into networks that operate at specific safety integrity levels (e.g., the DO-178B software levels). 3. ARP 4754 and FAA policy be extended to address attack prevention and mitigation by using security controls. IA controls need to comply with best common IA practice, which is defined by the NSA’s IATF [50]. These controls need to be implemented in accordance with best current defense-in-depth practices. 4. Aircraft be defined as Mobile ASs, which have embedded VPN network enclave partitions, each of which operates at a specific assurance level. 5. The aircraft should be configured as a mobile AS that moves in reference to other ASs within the larger worldwide aeronautical system. In this approach, each individual networked entity within aircraft is IP addressed and the network topology changes that occur as the aircraft moves are handled by the BGP protocol that links the aircraft to other ASs. IP addressing issues may arise with this model depending on whether the aircraft’s IP addresses are associated with a specific service provider (e.g., CIDR; see RFC 1517) or not. 6. DO-178B and ARP 4754 processes be extended to include security vulnerability penetration tests of the integrated airborne network, systems, and each of its constituent items prior to initial certification and deployment. This includes examining their actual vulnerability to attacks as shown in appendix A (e.g., network mapping, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, password cracking, etc.). 7. Devices operating at specific criticality levels (i.e., failure condition categories, ARP 4754 system development assurance levels, DO-178B software levels, DO-254 Hardware Design Assurance Levels) should be organized into specific network partitions (VPN network enclaves) that operate at a specific assurance level in a manner parallel to the DoD classification levels. Network enclaves for IP networks should be established by 141
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
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Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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Page 153 and 154: 11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
Page 155: environments should be extended to
Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168: 32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 187 and 188: authorized to perform. 13 However,
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194: • Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
Page 195 and 196: affected by the signal intermittenc
Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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