Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

More documents

Recommendations

Info

support computing devices that function at different classification levels, they deploy distinct networks, each operating at that classification level. Alternatively, the devices can be connected in highly controlled ways via HAGs. These onboard computing devices and networks, are RED networks. Aircraft communicate together, and to ground stations, via wireless media that operate at an unclassified level. The onboard networks undergo COMSEC encryption and encapsulation into BLACK IP network headers to be conveyed across the wireless unclassified network. Thus, two distinct network systems exist: RED networks support end users and computer applications that are used by onboard communications. BLACK networks support the air-to-ground and air-to-air conveyance of that information. If aircraft flying a common mission together establish RED network connectivity between themselves across BLACK air-to-air communications, then that mission logically functions as shown in figure 18(b). Specifically, different RED LAN segments within aircraft can become linked together to form common RED network systems, each operating at a specific classification level (e.g., sensitive but unclassified (SBU), secret, or top secret). Each of these RED systems can also communicate with equivalent remote computer applications or personnel at the same classification that are located in the same or different theaters of operation. For example, the figure 18(b) shows a mission that contains communicating elements (e.g., personnel or applications) that operate at three different classification levels: SBU, secret, and top secret. Each of these entities are shown as communicating with entities located within ground networks operating at their same classification level (e.g., the nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network is an SBU network, and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network is a secret network). 5.3 INTERNET PROTOCOL TOPOLOGY HIERARCHY AND POLICY SYSTEMS. The IP natively supports a topology hierarchy comprised of increasing aggregations of networking elements (see figure 19). The figure shows that the IP assumes that the network interfaces with devices that are grouped into subnetworks, which are grouped into larger aggregations, depending on the scaling needs of the deployment. If the deployment has modest scaling needs, then subnetworks are grouped into an AS. If the deployment has larger scaling requirements, then subnetworks can be grouped into areas, which are grouped into an AS. A centerpiece of this hierarchy is the AS, which is the unit of routing policy within the IP topology hierarchy. IP’s standard (IGP, i.e., OSPF, intermediate system to intermediate system (IS-IS)) internally support up to two layers of hierarchy. When both layers of internal hierarchy are supported, then aggregations of subnetworks into areas occur, otherwise the IGP is deployed with a single layer of hierarchy, such that subnetworks are grouped into an AS. Therefore, IP’s IGP dynamically groups subnetworks or areas into ASs. IP’s EGP is the BGP, which is used to group ASs into internets (also known as “network-of-networks”). 58
Internet (grouping of autonomous systems) Transport Constructed via EGP Protocol (BGP) Autonomous System (grouping of areas or subnetworks) AS is the unit of routing policy within the IP Topology Hierarchy Optional: Areas/Domains (grouping of subnetworks) IP’s Interior Gateway Protocols (IGP; i.e., OSPF, IS-IS) may be deployed using either one or two layers of hierarchy (one to link subnetworks into areas and one to link areas into ASes; the former is shown here, the latter shown above) Subnetworks (grouping of interfaces) backbone Constructed via IGP protocols Interfaces (network interface(s) of a device) Figure 19. Internet Protocol Topology Hierarchy As shown in the figure, each of these increasingly aggregated constructs is hierarchically constructed (e.g., a backbone or transport infrastructure connects leaf entities into a whole). This indirectly reflects a generic principal that network infrastructures have enhanced scalability and performance properties if they are organized hierarchically (e.g., references 53-58 discuss that principal as it applies to wireless networks). However, limiting deployments to purely hierarchical constructs has proven to be operationally confining for some network deployments, causing a less purely hierarchical provision to also be supported in a limited manner. For example, OSPF’s not-so-stubby area permits a specific nonbackbone area to support BGP connections to another AS rather than the normal hierarchical case where only the backbone area can support such connections. The AS is the unit of routing policy (e.g., security, QoS) within the IP topology hierarchy. This observation reflects the fact that an AS is a single administrative domain. For example, a corporation’s network is grouped into an AS and relates to other corporations via the Internet’s network-of-networks Internet infrastructure. In addition to providing routing information about the larger network-of-networks through their pairwise BGP connections, the connected ASs also establish formal relationships between each other where they specify how QoS, security, and packet data flow will be handled between each other’s domains. 5.4 MECHANISMS TO CONNECT AIRCRAFT TO NETWORKS. At least three very different models have been proposed for connecting aircraft to IP networks. Each of these models carries different assumptions and requirements. 59
Page 1 and 2:
DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
Page 3 and 4:
1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
Page 5 and 6:
5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
Page 7 and 8:
11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
Page 9 and 10:
22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
Page 11 and 12:
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 13 and 14:
PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
Page 15 and 16:
This report states that the primary
Page 17 and 18:
1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
Page 19 and 20:
protocol (IP)-based communications.
Page 21 and 22:
of linking aircraft-resident system
Page 23 and 24: Industry and governments are extrem
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27 and 28: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 29 and 30: • The security viability of curre
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126:
to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
Page 127 and 128:
using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130:
mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132:
HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134:
8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
Page 135 and 136:
(AJ) or low probability of intercep
Page 137 and 138:
design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140:
9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142:
9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144:
alerted the pilots because the fail
Page 145 and 146:
environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148:
DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150:
elationship with other equipment in
Page 151 and 152:
approach is to keep the log informa
Page 153 and 154:
11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
Page 155 and 156:
environments should be extended to
Page 157 and 158:
12. COTS computer systems cannot be
Page 159 and 160:
14. NAS and airborne network archit
Page 161 and 162:
22. If SWAP considerations permit,
Page 163 and 164:
11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166:
9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168:
32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
Page 169 and 170:
59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172:
the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174:
Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176:
Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178:
Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180:
information found within these data
Page 181 and 182:
(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
Page 183 and 184:
The simple network management proto
Page 185 and 186:
opportunities to crack the hosting
Page 187 and 188:
authorized to perform. 13 However,
Page 189 and 190:
sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
Page 191 and 192:
A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194:
• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
Page 195 and 196:
affected by the signal intermittenc
Page 197 and 198:
A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200:
Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202:
Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204:
should be emphasized that there is
show all

Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?