Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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unless, of course, the firewall has established a reverse proxy that is equipped to handle this type of threat. Attackers can similarly control what is happening on devices within the firewall by communicating with the cracked device via HTTP (port 80), a protocol that is rarely blocked by any firewall. Routers have similar vulnerabilities to end-systems except that they are more likely than endsystems to be identified by traceroute and they usually have substantially fewer resident application daemons for the attacker to potentially exploit. Attackers often attack routers through SNMP. There are many security problems with SNMP (see section 4.6). These systems are particularly vulnerable if older versions of SNMP (i.e., SNMPv1 or SNMPv2) are being used or if the default SNMP community names have not been altered or removed from the network device previous to deployment (e.g., “public,” “write,” “user” are common default SNMP account names on routers, usually without any associated password protections). Similar vulnerabilities exist for the default accounts and maintenance accounts that come on most networking devices. In all other respects, the threats and exploits affecting network devices such as routers are the same as those affecting computers, except that the network devices traditionally have substantially fewer applications, and therefore less vulnerability for attackers to exploit. A.3 AVAILABILITY ATTACKS. These attacks do not seek to take over devices or network systems, but rather seek to make the network systems supporting devices become ineffectual. A number of controls have been proposed to thwart specific classes of availability attacks. Some of these controls have been demonstrated in laboratory environments. However, other than securing the data communications protocols themselves (see section 4.5), few if any of these mechanisms have yet been demonstrated to be effective within actual operational network deployments. Thus, effective defenses against many classes of availability attacks are not yet available within today’s best current practices. A-13
A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. There are a myriad of possible ways that DoS attacks may occur within networks. So many, in fact, that a complete enumeration of the possible mechanisms is probably not possible. However, RFCs 3704 and 3882 provide guidance to protect against certain classes of DoS attacks. The following are some of the more commonly known DoS exploits. • Insertion of bogus routing data into the routing table causing routing loops, needlessly delaying, or needlessly dropping packets • Computers sending vast amount of traffic to a device’s port address • Nmap-based scan attacks against devices using some other computer’s source IP Addresses • Hosts sending vast amounts of traffic to other hosts within networks A.3.2 DISRUPTING ROUTING. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has recently begun to enumerate the specific threats associated with standard IETF protocols. These threats can directly or indirectly disrupt routing systems 15 . They have produced three documents that address threats to routing protocols [A-15, A-16, and A-17]. Reference A-18 discusses the generic threats to routing protocols. Routing protocols are vulnerable to potential attacks against any one of the three functions that they share in common: • “Transport Subsystem: The routing protocol transmits messages to its neighbors using some underlying protocol. For example, OSPF uses IP, while other protocols may run over TCP. • “Neighbor State Maintenance: neighboring relationship formation is the first step for topology determination. For this reason, routing protocols may need to maintain the state of their neighbors. Each routing protocol may use a different mechanism for determining its neighbors in the routing topology. Some protocols have distinct exchange sequences used to establish neighboring relationships, e.g., Hello exchanges in OSPF. • “Database Maintenance: Routing protocols exchange network topology and reachability information. The routers collect this information in routing databases with varying detail. The maintenance of these databases is a significant portion of the function of a routing protocol.” (Quoted from Section 2 of reference A-15.) 15 see http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/rpsec-charter.html A-14
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
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Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
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