Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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leveraging IPsec’s ESP in tunnel mode in direct parallel to current U.S. DoD COMSEC and some civilian VPN practices. 8. While military technologies could be used to implement the airborne network partitions, the use of civilian Internet protocols be deployed as a virtual private network. Specifically, this study recommends that the airborne community use the IETF’s L3VPN IPsec variant of RFC 4364 [99] for its VPN technology. 9. Because of SWAP considerations and the network management issues associated with how to manage VPN enclaves, the VPN encapsulation be established by means of an encapsulation gateway middlebox, rather than the traditional dual PE and CE router approach (see figure 34) commonly used by reference 99 conformant implementations. 10. Although the network partition capabilities and assurance of VPNs are demonstrably sound, security vulnerabilities (depending on how it is implemented) may potentially be introduced by bringing in network management capabilities into the encapsulating gateways (see section 8.4) that otherwise could not occur within a VPN system. For this reason, this study recommends that the encapsulation gateways be deployed with the following additional defense-in-depth security control protections: • Firewall (and, if in a nonair gap target environment, the packet filter as well) to be configured to discard any non-IPsec packets addressed to airborne encapsulating gateways. • The encapsulating gateway should also be configured to discard any packet sent to it that does not use IPsec’s ESP. It decapsulates and decrypts any received tunnel mode packets and forwards them to the VPN. Received transport mode packets are those communications to the encapsulating gateway itself. All transport mode packets must be successfully authenticated by the encapsulating gateway or else discarded. • QoS provisions ensuring that the VPN is provided adequate network capacity (e.g., to avoid DoS) are also needed to ensure the viability of VPN partitioning. 11. The encapsulation gateways will need to be certified as a high-assurance security item (i.e., EAL 5 or higher). 12. Onboard aircraft network LAN implementations should also support physical (i.e., hardware based) network protections to implement integrity enclave separation to physically isolate devices using a common LAN system into networked enclaves on a need-to-communicate basis [9]. 13. Network communications between devices connected within each network enclave should be supplemented with IPsec’s ESP in transport mode security protections whenever permitted by the specific communications performance requirements. 142
14. NAS and airborne network architecture and design should follow best common IA security practices [20, 83, and 85]. 15. Approaches to authenticate and authorize network managers be carefully considered. This study recommends that administrative personnel be authenticated by two factored authentication systems; e.g., the administrator’s PKI identity coupled with either what he knows (e.g., pass phrase) or what he is (i.e., biometrics). It is also recommended that administrative authorizations be restricted in terms of separation of duties with least privilege. For example, different people must work on airborne security topics than can work on other airborne administrative topics. 16. All activities performed by administrators upon aircraft software and systems must be automatically logged. At a minimum, the log files should: state exactly what the administrator did; contain the individual identification of the specific maintenance personnel who did it; and provide a timestamp and the identification of the networked device from which the administration occurred. All log records must be protected against modification or erasure. One possible approach is to keep the log information both on the aircraft and on the ground and create an alarm whenever the two copies contain different information (e.g., produced different hashes). 17. The signals in space (e.g., radio or satellite communications) used for ground-to-air communications must use transport security cover (i.e., encryption of the wireless signal in space occurring at the OSI physical layer). This hinders nonauthorized entities from eavesdropping upon these communications and discourages attempts to potentially inject false communication signals into the data stream (e.g., possible man-in-the-middle attacks). However, these links will remain potentially vulnerable to availability attacks caused by hostile jamming unless mitigation techniques such as AJ waveforms or LPI/LPD waveforms were also used. 18. Airborne or NAS systems should not be designed using technologies that require significant policy complexity for all (or a majority of) the networked devices or a high degree of policy coordination between all of the networked elements (see section 5.7). 19. Aircraft control and the cockpit (pilot) networks or their devices should not be physically accessible by aircraft passengers. If there is any possibility of passengers physically accessing the cockpit (pilot) network, then the high-assurance LAN within the cockpit must be connected to the aircraft control network via the packet filter. Otherwise, the high-assurance LAN in the cockpit can use the same physical high-assurance LAN as aircraft control. The noncockpit crew network devices should also not be accessible by passengers, but the design could accommodate situations in which passengers are not always physically excluded from the area where those devices are located. If physical separation is not possible, crew members must be very careful to not leave open applications running in situations when the crew member is not present (i.e., situations where passengers may access applications that have been opened with crew member authentications). 143
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168: 32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 187 and 188: authorized to perform. 13 However,
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194: • Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
Page 195 and 196: affected by the signal intermittenc
Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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