Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Protections against these types of safety threats are primarily accomplished by means of deploying effective information assurance (IA) security controls. Safety and security have, therefore, become intertwined concepts within networked airborne environments. Security engineering addresses the potential for failure of security controls caused by malicious actions or other means. Safety analysis focuses on the affects of failure modes. The two concepts (safety and security) are, therefore, directly related through failure effects. A shortcoming of either a safety process or a security process may cause a failure in a respective safety or security mechanism, with possible safety consequences to the aircraft, depending on the specific consequence of that failure. This study deals with the security and safety issues and acceptance criteria of networked LANs in aircraft. In view of the discussion above, this study cannot merely evaluate the safety and security implications of introducing LANs to aircraft in an isolated manner. Rather, the systemwide consequences associated with these changes must be evaluated. At a minimum, this comprises two distinct but related concepts: • The security and safety issues, including acceptance criteria, of linking aircraft-resident systems upon a common network infrastructure. This common data bus causes those systems to no longer be physically isolated from each other. Rather, it links them into a common communications system. A direct consequence of this change is that formerly isolated onboard software systems have become theoretically accessible via a common onboard communications system. This common onboard communication system is also connected to the aircraft’s air-to-ground communication system. • As described in the bullets shown on pages 3 and 4, anticipated network-centric changes to the NAS itself results in NAS systems being increasingly redefined into networkcentric systems. This includes the possibility of aircraft systems being accessible from expanding regions of the NAS. Should the NAS itself become connected to public data communications systems, such as the Internet, then this would result in the theoretical possibility of aircraft being accessible from systems outside of the NAS. Specifically, should the NAS become connected to the Internet, the theoretical possibility exists of accessing aircraft from any location worldwide. By combining these two concepts, the net result is the theoretical possibility that specific aircraft-resident systems may become accessible from any location worldwide. This possibility has potentially severe safety assurance implications. However, similar risks result even when no entities using aircraft LANs are involved in communications with entities outside of the aircraft. This is because attackers do not need to access aircraft-resident systems to launch electronic attacks upon aircraft—similar affects can be achieved solely by attacking ground-resident NAS elements. For example, “One of the most frightening images of cyber terrorism is a scenario in which terrorists take over the air traffic control system and cause an aircraft to crash or two planes to collide in flight. 6
Industry and governments are extremely sensitive even to the appearance of threats and vulnerabilities. A collapse of public confidence in civil aviation safety, and a failure to manage public expectation, may have serious and widespread economic and social consequences.” [14] These affects may be similar to the events following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Ken Birman has noted that parallel network-centric evolutions are widespread throughout our society. He warns that “We’re poised to put air-traffic control, banking, military command-and-control, electronic medical records, and other vital systems into the hands of a profoundly insecure, untrustworthy platform cobbled together from complex legacy software components.” [15] The potential scale of harm from a successful electronic attack against elements within a network-centric NAS system, including network-connected aircraft, is huge. Adversaries may be anonymous and range from individual recreational hackers to well-financed criminal enterprises to well-organized, state-led initiatives. To the extent that the NAS builds upon COTS technologies, the technology employed for electronic attacks will be simple, cheap, and widely available. Reliance upon advances in COTS technology creates an extremely fluid threat environment as historic security vulnerabilities are addressed and new vulnerabilities discovered [16]. Fortunately, lessons from industry (civilian) and military security processes and experience can be applied to the aviation industry. This report, therefore, examines the safety and security issues introduced by networked LANs on aircraft. It seeks to adapt industry’s best system security engineering (SSE) practices to identify safety risks caused by aircraft networks. It identifies potential security threats and assesses evaluation criteria. It leverages best current industry and military practices. It proposes specific extensions to ARP 4751 and DO-178B processes to address network security threats and certification issues that arise from networking airborne systems. 2. OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH. The purpose of this report is to document evaluation criteria that can be used by certification authorities and industry to ensure that onboard networks will not negatively impact aircraft safety. The results will be used by the FAA as input for development of policy, guidance, and regulations. This work is divided into two phases. The first phase focused on the potential security risks of onboard networks that affect safety and explored issues and solutions to critical questions raised by the aviation industry as manufacturers consider using LANs in aircraft. Initial acceptance criteria for certifying aircraft that use LANs is provided to help evaluators understand the safety and security issues and specific evidence needed to show that proposed designs and countermeasures are sufficient to ensure safety of flight. 7
Page 1 and 2: DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
Page 3 and 4: 1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
Page 5 and 6: 5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
Page 7 and 8: 11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
Page 9 and 10: 22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 13 and 14: PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
Page 15 and 16: This report states that the primary
Page 17 and 18: 1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
Page 19 and 20: protocol (IP)-based communications.
Page 21: of linking aircraft-resident system
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27 and 28: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 29 and 30: • The security viability of curre
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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