Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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imploded due to the complexity of policy semantics causing prohibitive schema complexity in multivendor environments. Because of this, the only surviving PBN systems are vendor proprietary systems that are limited to a specific vendor’s product lines. The remainder of this section can be skipped for readers who are not interested in this topic because it does not relate to the exemplar network architecture recommended by this study in any way. Figure 23 shows a PBN framework that generically applies to many of the historic PBN approaches. Policy Repository Policy Management Tool PDP IP Packets to/from other Network Devices PEP IP Packets to/from other Network Devices Figure 23. Historic PBN Framework This figure is comprised of the following entities: • A policy management tool that modifies the data found within the policy repository to articulate the current policies of the current deployment (e.g., a policy language response to environmental triggers). Policy is a set of rules that are used to manage and control the changing or maintaining the state of one or more managed objects. A policy rule is made up of four items: (1) metadata and semantics that define the behavior of the policy, (2) one or more events that trigger the policy, (3) a condition clause, and (4) an action clause. • There are two distinct functions within PBN systems: - Policy Distribution Point is the mechanism for pushing policies and configuration data to configure a policy enforcement point (PEP). - Policy Decision Point is the functionality used by a PEP to enquire what it should do in specific situations. In this latter use case, the policy decision point instructs the PEP as to the proper action it should perform to enact the policies established for that AS. • The PEP is the entity that actually enacts policy (i.e., a device). 70
Although the vast majority of PBN systems conformed to the architecture shown in figure 23, PBN approaches are historically divided into several distinct factions. Most of these alternatives are facing dwindling support today due to the complexity of their underlying policy systems. The more widely known PBN approaches include: • The Distributed Management Task Force’s 21 common information model (CIM) and directory-enabled networking (DEN) work. The DMTF CIM model is widely supported by most NMSs. However, many vendors have also tried to use CIM and DEN to enable PBN. Those latter attempts have not succeeded due to schema complexities. • The IETF’s 22 former Resource Allocation Protocol working group previously defined the COPS (see RFC 2748 and RFC 2749) protocols as well as an alternative approach to CIM/DEN for specifying policy and device configurations. This latter approach was defined by RFC 3159, “Structure of Policy Provisioning Information (SPPI).” This work leveraged the existing SNMP MIB work that is widely used today within IP-oriented NMSs to create a parallel structure to the MIB for conveying policy and configuration data, the policy information base (PIB). This latter concept was quite popular within the IETF for many years, influencing many other IETF working groups, including IP security policy (IPSP) and the Differentiated Services QoS working groups. Unfortunately, the various IETF PIBs were poorly coordinated together. Many of them used different schemas to do similar things, and the complexity of many of these systems was significant. For these reasons, this work has also lost its former popularity and mind share. • The TeleManagement Forum’s 23 shared information and data work, including their next generation DEN work, which is unrelated to the DMTF DEN work. Although the construction of large multivendor policy-based systems had achieved a significant amount of mind share at one time, actually trying to build PBN systems using the figure 23 model consistently demonstrated how difficult and challenging the articulation of policy itself turns out to be [68]. Because of the sheer complexity associated with policy articulation (e.g., RFC 3060, RFC 3084, RFC 3159, RFC 3317, RFC 3318, RFC 3460, RFC 3571, and RFC 3585), multivendor PBN attempts to date have ultimately imploded. For this reason, this study recommends that airborne or NAS systems should not be designed using technologies that require significant policy complexity or a high degree of policy coordination between networked elements. By contrast, Steve Bellovin wrote a report in 1999, “Distributed Firewalls” [69], which described a mechanism to build policy-based networks by leveraging the IPsec protocol (see RFC 4301). IPsec is a protocol that is implemented natively by IP devices. This approach addressed most of 21 DMTF; http://www.dmtf.org 22 IETF; http://www.ietf.org 23 TMF; http://www.tmforum.org 71
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
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Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
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Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
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Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
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Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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