Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Figure 32 shows how these threats are addressed in a defense-in-depth manner. Larger the network, the larger the number of threats—Indirect Internet connectivity means 1B+ potential human users • VPN for network partitioning • Firewall for network perimeter defense • IPsec required for protocol security End users are now part of security framework • VPN for network partitioning • Packet filter keeps passengers from accessing inappropriate Items and LANs Availability of Airborne LAN • Firewall and packet filter to control access • QoS policies ensure support for VPN traffic Integrity of computers, networks, applications, and data COTS device security questionable (e.g., routers, PCs) and subject to compromise Complex internet protocol family security • VPN for networking partitioning • Firewall and packet filter for LAN defense • IPsec for secure protocol interactions • Secure software download and integrity checks • IATF defense-in-depth security controls • Increase CC assurance when relied upon • Only attached to VPN via HAG Use available IETF protocols’ security Alternatives and IPsec whenever possible SNMPv3 security issues • Always use IPsec with SNMPv3 • Once improved SNMPv3 alternative (i.e., ISMS) available, preferentially use it. Figure 32. How Design Addresses Network Threats Because all communications between aircraft and other aircraft or ground stations occur across AS boundaries (see section 5.3), aircraft networks form BGP relationships with their peer ASs on the ground or in the air. The aircraft’s ASBR is not shown in figure 30, but it is physically located between the airplane’s high-assurance LAN and the air-to-ground communications within the figure. That ASBR links the airplane’s network to other ASs (air- or ground-based). The following sections each describe a specific security control that is identified within figure 30. Please note that the configurations described in these sections will produce the defense-indepth results shown in figure 32. 8.3.1 The VPN Encapsulation Method. The VPN encapsulation is accomplished by using IPsec’s ESP in tunnel mode in accordance with reference 99. The encapsulating gateways that perform the tunnel mode service may theoretically be end-systems, routers, or middleboxes. However, because the items located within the VPN needs to be managed by means of the agency of the encapsulating gateway (see section 8.4), this architecture presumes that the encapsulating gateways will preferentially be middleboxes. If they are middleboxes, then it is very important that they not decrement the time- 108
to-live (TTL) field in the IP header of the encapsulated (RED) packets of the forwarded packets so that they remain transparent to the packet flow. (Note: if they are end-systems, they similarly will not decrement the TTL. However, if they are routers, then they will need to decrement the TTL because that is normal router behavior.) The selected VPN approach for this architecture uses IPsec in tunnel mode. It was designed by the L3VPN working group of the IETF [100]. This VPN design is entitled “Architecture for the Use of PE-PE IPsec Tunnels in BGP/MPLS IP VPNs” [99]. (Note: at the time of this writing, reference 99 has passed the IETF L3VPN working group’s last call and is currently in the RFC editor’s queue to be issued as an Informational RFC.) This is the secured IPsec variant to the L3VPN’s VPN design approach, which is “BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks” that was defined in RFC 4364. RFC 4364 is an IETF Proposed Standard protocol. The high-level architectural view of figure 30 does not show the encapsulation method recommended by this architecture. The encapsulation method detail is shown in figure 33. Section 5.6 introduced the concept of VPN and section 5.2 described the current DoD COMSEC approach using a type of IPsec VPN. The particular VPN variant selected for this design was chosen because of its scalability, minimal latency, and high security properties. However, other VPN alternatives also exist (e.g., Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (see RFC 4214); IP with virtual link extension [101]; Teredo (see RFC 4380); and the bump-in-the-wire security gateway of RFC 4301). Aircraft Level A Level D Inner IP header addressed using “Level A” IP Address Space Inner IP header addressed using “Level D” IP Address Space Encapsulation Gateway Encapsulation Gateway Outer IP header Addressed using “Service Provider” IP Address Space High Assurance LAN Outer IP header Addressed using “Service Provider” IP Address Space Figure 33. Close-Up Detail of How Encapsulation is Accomplished Figure 34 shows the current architecture that underlies this design. This figure, which is a copy of Figure 1.1 from RFC 4110, shows that an ISP provides a provider edge (PE) interface to their network services. The fact that these network services are physically conveyed via a VPN through the service provider’s network infrastructure is not necessarily known to their customers, who interface to the PE interface device via their own Customer Edge (CE) device. 109
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
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Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
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Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
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Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
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Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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