Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Similar guidance is also provided for airborne electronic hardware (e.g., DO-254). The principals that pertain to networking airborne systems that are addressed in this report directly pertain to all networked system entities, both software and hardware. This report’s resulting exemplar network architecture (see section 8.3) is therefore agnostic concerning whether the airborne networked entities are hardware, software, or a combination of both. Historically, many software entities onboard aircraft are embedded in systems performing specialized mission-related functions. COTS-generic computing devices are increasingly being deployed within the National Airspace System (NAS), and they are occasionally deployed within aircraft as well. 1 John Knight [7] identifies two primary reasons for the increased use of generalpurpose computing devices and hardware (e.g., microprocessors, random access memory (RAM), and memory management unit): 1. For enhanced avionics functionality. Specifically, entirely new concepts become possible with the introduction of digital systems. These include modern autopilot technology with greater functionality and flexibility than was possible with historic analog systems, modern full authority digital engine controls, envelope protection systems, and flight deck automation (“glass cockpit”). 2. For enhanced safety. Examples include aircraft condition analysis and management systems, structural health monitoring, and automatic alerts of potential runway incursions. DO-178B and supporting advisory circulars address all phases of the software development process for all software types to ensure that airborne systems are safe. This includes electronic flight bag computing devices [8]. These cumulative systems, processes, and guidelines were historically targeted for aircraft environments whose internal networks are specialized to accomplish specific mission functionality. Aircraft devices are historically connected via specialized and sometimes proprietary data buses to other devices with which they perform associated functions. The nature of these connections is tailored to support their specific communication requirements (e.g., deterministic real time, asynchronous, etc.). Air-to-ground communication similarly occurs via special-purpose communication systems using specialpurpose data communication protocols. Visionaries anticipate forces that could motivate future airborne system designs to replace today’s diverse data bus systems within aircraft, including many of their current constraints (e.g., access point limitations, proprietary protocols, labeling, and mitigations such as cyclic redundancy checks), with airplane-appropriate LAN technologies that support standard Internet 1 COTS software components are very rare critical airborne systems and are discouraged from being deployed in those environments because they cannot comply with DO-178B and other software policy in general. 2
protocol (IP)-based communications. For example, reference 9 concluded that Ethernet-based LANs could be appropriate to serve as aviation data buses if they use “a switched Ethernet topology along with traffic regulation, bandwidth restriction (guarantee and control of bandwidth allocation), and call admission control.” Coupled with the linkage of aircraft systems via a common network system is a growing perception of the desirability to improve and enhance air-to-ground and air-to-air communication systems and processes as well as to more closely integrate airborne systems with NAS systems. For example: • Integrating multiple data bus systems into onboard LAN(s) is expected to reduce aircraft size, weight, and power (SWAP) overheads, thereby improving aircraft flight performance parameters. • Next generation aircraft display systems may want to combine map and air traffic data, terrain information, weather radar returns, information on man-made obstacles, and imagery on the airport environment. This would require fusing data from sources that are not currently associated together. It would also necessitate the support of highbandwidth data communications internally within the aircraft, as well as air-to-ground and within the NAS. • National Aeronautics and Space Administration Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) is investigating mechanisms that would enable small aircraft to fly to and from the 5400 small airports that are not currently being used for reliable public transportation. “A key to implanting SATS is a robust and extremely reliable automated communications system. The system must be capable of passing large amounts of data between aircraft and ground systems as well as between neighboring aircraft in a reliable manner” [10]. • George Donohue, former FAA Associate Administrator of Research and Acquisition, has expressed concerns that the United States’ “air transportation network is seriously overloaded in the major cities that support airline hub operations. … This … is leading to a gradual decrease in the US air transportation system safety. … There is a growing consensus over the last 3 years that the capacity of the US National Airspace System is finite and currently approaching critical saturation limits. … Without new technology and operational procedures, we cannot increase capacity without decreasing the systems safety. … Without increased capacity, the increased cost of air transportation will effectively suppress demand (for new aircraft, domestic tourism, international travel, etc.) and have a profound effect on the nation’s culture and economy. … System maximum capacity is very sensitive to aircraft final approach spacing. Decreasing aircraft separation in the final approach to a runway from an average of 4 nautical miles between aircraft to 3 nautical miles 3
Page 1 and 2: DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
Page 3 and 4: 1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
Page 5 and 6: 5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
Page 7 and 8: 11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
Page 9 and 10: 22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 13 and 14: PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
Page 15 and 16: This report states that the primary
Page 17: 1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
Page 21 and 22: of linking aircraft-resident system
Page 23 and 24: Industry and governments are extrem
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27 and 28: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 29 and 30: • The security viability of curre
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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