Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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connection accepted, with the ACK bit used to distinguish between those two possibilities. However, in the context of this report, the TCP SYN attack is a well-known denial of service (DoS) attack that involves sending the target multiple TCP SYN messages with no intention of following with an ACK. This forces the targets to process the SYN messages, to send out the SYN/ACK messages, and to maintain a half-open connection while waiting for an ACK that never arrives. The goal is to force the target to maintain so many of these connections that it is not capable of accepting any further connections requests. TCP—The state machine that underlies the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) uses a number of bits within the TCP Protocol Header. Various exploits leverage weaknesses in the TCP protocol itself and implementations of the protocol. The primary bits are: • The Urgent pointer (URG) is used to indicate a byte offset from the current sequence number at which urgent data are to be found; • The Acknowledgement number (ACK) is set to 1 indicates that the Acknowledgement number field in the TCP protocol header is valid; • The PUSHed data (PSH) bit requests the receiver to deliver the data to the application upon arrival and not to buffer it until a full buffer has been received; • The reset (RST) bit is used to reset a connection that has become confused due to a host crash or some other reason; • The synchronous (SYN) bit is used to establish connections; and • The final (FIN) bit is used to release a connection. It specifies that the sender has no more data to transmit. However, after closing a connection, a process may continue to receive data indefinitely. Both SYN and FIN segments have sequence numbers and are thus guaranteed to be processed in the correct order. TCSEC—The U.S. Department of Defense developed the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, which is used to evaluate operating systems, applications and systems. It is also known as the “Orange Book” because it was originally issued with an orange cover. This criteria provides a security metric that can be used to compare different systems. It also provides direction for manufacturers so they can know what specifications to build to. Threat—The potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability (NIST 800-30). 160
Threat source—Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability, or (2) a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability. TLL field—The time to live (TTL) field indicates to routers whether the packet has been in the network too long and should be discarded. More specifically, this field in the IPv4 packet header is a counter used to limit packet lifetimes to protect against routing loops. It is decremented at each hop. When the TTL becomes zero, then the packet is discarded. This field is known as the hop limit field in IPv6 packet headers. Traceroute—Traceroute is a popular application that was originally created by Van Jacobson to enumerate the series of IP network hops (e.g., routers) that a packet traverses to reach its destination. It is invoked as “traceroute hostname” where hotstname is the destination target. The user then will receive a report enumerating every router between the invocation location node and the destination node. Trust—Reliance on the ability of a system to meet its specifications. Vulnerability—A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and could result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy. whois—Quote from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whois: “WHOIS (pronounced “who is”; not an acronym) is a TCP-based query/response protocol that is widely used for querying an official database to determine the owner of a domain name, an IP address, or an autonomous system number on the Internet. WHOIS lookups were traditionally made using a command line interface, but a number of simplified web-based tools now exist for looking up domain ownership details from different databases. Web-based WHOIS clients still rely on the WHOIS protocol to connect to a WHOIS server and do lookups, and command-line WHOIS clients are still quite widely used by system administrators” An example is http://www.whois.net/ 161/162
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168: 32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
Page 181 and 182: (HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194: • Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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