Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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with extensive scrutiny. The larger the code base, the more questionable the quality of the scrutiny. This means that software developers need to actively consider how to create high-assurance software for network environments so that the resulting software can be assured to be as bug free as possible. Until a theoretical solution is devised that produces guaranteed, high-assurance, bug free results, high-assurance software needs to undergo a very thorough (formal) line-by-line code inspection. A possible alternative is for the software developer to assemble high-assurance software modules. The integration of these modules faces the same types of integration issues addressed in ARP 4754, but this may potentially result in an approval approach in which only a select subset of the total software corpus will require a formal line-by-line code inspection. 27. All software in networked environments should comply with the processes established by an FAA-approved software distribution (i.e., storage and download) system. Software development processes need to include concrete plans for how software will be maintained and securely distributed over the software’s life span. 28. Software that is currently hosted on COTS OSs should be evaluated to be ported to a more secure foundation. High-assurance software (i.e., Levels A and B) cannot reside on COTS OSs, because COTS OSs are not high-assurance and contain latent vulnerabilities that can be attacked. That software should be either ported to reside on a high-assurance OS or else rewritten to not reside on any OS. 29. The worldwide civil aviation community should identify common solutions for identity (see section 4.8), IP addressing (see sections 5.3 and 5.4), naming, routing (see section 5.5), protocol security (see section 4.5), and authentication (see section 4.9) subsystems. These common approaches need to be realized by consistent technology and configuration choices that produce a coherent worldwide civil aviation network infrastructure. These important technical issues need to be agreed upon by the aeronautical community before airborne avionics systems become networked to other aircraft or ground systems. This is because the safety of networked airborne LAN systems is potentially affected by the quality and integrity of the network system that is created by the worldwide civil aviation community. It is risky to permit networked airborne LAN systems to be created before the worldwide civil aviation community has decided on a common approach to address these key subsystems. Aircraft need to handle identity, IP addressing, naming, routing, protocol security, and authentication in a consistent manner with each other and with civil aviation ground systems if aircraft and NAS systems are to be networked together. The interfaces of both airborne and ground systems therefore need to be carefully articulated and designed if potentially significant security problems are to be avoided. 30. This study recommends that the FAA evaluate using AJ waveforms for air-to-ground communications. 31. Before a worldwide civil aviation network can be deployed, the worldwide civil aviation community explicitly should determine the policies and trust models that will pertain to the worldwide civil aviation network infrastructure. 146
11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY. This report identifies the following topics as needing further study: • Pertaining to the last recommendation noted above, what is the trust model between civil aviation regions? Will the trust model for the regions’ Level A software network partitions (enclaves) be the same as for their Level C software network enclaves? What is the trust model between aircraft and ground entities? If air-to-air communications occur, what is the trust model between aircraft belonging to different airlines? Will the Level A VPN components of the NAS completely trust European Level A VPN components and vice versa, or will they establish distinct policies and SLA mappings between their components? What security protections (e.g., firewalls) will be inserted to protect the rest of the VPN elements at that safety level from a contamination that occurred within a specific region? How will aircraft that travel between regions maintain their connectivity in a seamless, safe, and secure manner? If air-to-air applications and systems are created, what mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) will protect the VPN at a given safety level in one airplane from (perhaps undiagnosed) misbehaviors occurring in the VPN at that same safety level in a different airplane? What policy systems will govern the interrelationship between aircraft and ground entities? Will SLAs be required? • The worldwide civil aviation community needs to identify common solutions for identity (see section 4.8), IP addressing (see sections 5.3 and 5.4), naming, routing (see section 5.5), protocol security (see section 4.5), and authentication (see section 4.9) subsystems. • Because network management issues for airborne networks are directly related to airline, manufacturer, and FAA concept of operations, this study has not provided a welldeveloped network management recommendation. Nevertheless, these issues need to be competently addressed and a viable network management system needs be designed if airborne LAN systems are to be safely networked. Therefore, network management designs and architectures need to be established for airborne networks. • Carol Taylor, Jim Alves-Foss, and Bob Rinker of the University of Idaho have studied the issue of dual software certification [93] for CC and DO-178B. Their study suggested that security functionality certified at EAL 5 can be directly compared with DO-178B Level A. This report recommends that their conclusion should be verified by further evaluation and study for the specific issue of establishing assurance equivalencies between CC-certified security controls and safety assurance levels. • Are there better mechanisms to address the problem of how best to remove latent software bugs that can be attacked from software items in networked environments? While testing probably provides part of the solution, it is obvious that testing alone cannot warranty the absence of bugs for elements unexamined by the test suite. Because of the vast array of possible software bugs that can exist, it is improbable that a complete testing corpus can be created. Therefore, best current practice is to continue to enforce line-by-line code inspection within the certification process for the highest assurance 147
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
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Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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