Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Unless the safety risks of a networked system have been controlled by leveraging the Biba Integrity Model, any such analysis would be improbable to perform adequately because of the many items involved and their many possible (potentially very subtle) interactions. Any such tests would be for the preattack environment and thus would represent an ideal that may become greatly modified during or after attacks. Many of these issues are addressed in the control life cycle concepts that are an integral part of the IATF defense-in-depth approach. • Issues arise in regard to Section 25.1309 e: “(e) Each installation whose functioning is required by this subchapter, and that requires a power supply, is an ‘essential load’ on the power supply. …” The same logic that Section 25.1309 e explains in regard to power supplies is also needed in networked environments to be applied to all possible software interactions that could affect aircraft operation. This includes obvious as well as subtle affects, intended as well as nonintended, and preattack as well as postattack variants. These of issues are addressed in the control life cycle concepts that are an integral part of the IATF’s defense-in-depth approach. 10.4 HOW WILL CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS AND MAINTENANCE BE ADDRESSED? The conclusions (see section 11) and exemplar airborne network architecture (see section 8.3) addresses how this study recommends that airworthiness be addressed. Maintenance in networked software environments can potentially differ significantly from current practice, depending on the actual software design, because authorized maintenance personnel no longer need to be physically proximate to the airplane to maintain its software systems. Maintenance in networked environments requires a robust authentication of the maintainer. This study recommends that maintenance personnel be authenticated by two factored authentication systems. For example, the administrator’s PKI identity (presuming that the civil aeronautical community selects PKI for its authentication technology) coupled with either what he knows (e.g., a pass phrase) or what he is (i.e., biometrics). It is often advisable that administrative authorizations be restricted in terms of separation of duties with least privilege. For example, different people are authorized to administer airborne security configurations than those who are authorized to handle the non-security-related network management functions, such as downloading software. It is important that all activities performed by administrators be automatically logged. At a minimum, the log files should state exactly the actions performed by the maintenance person, contain the individual identification of the specific maintenance personnel who performed it, as well as a timestamp and the identification of the networked device from which the administration occurred. All log records should be protected against modification or erasure. One possible 134
approach is to keep the log information both on the aircraft and on the ground and to create an alarm whenever the two copies contain different information (e.g., produce different hashes). 10.5 HOW CAN IT BE ENSURED THAT NETWORKED SYSTEMS CANNOT IMPACT SAFETY? The recommendations and exemplar airborne network architecture of this study are the answer to this question. For example, see figure 32. 10.6 WHAT SHOULD THE PROCESS BE FOR UPDATING SECURITY PROTECTION SOFTWARE? The aircraft design should specify the mechanism by which security protection software is updated. It is important that security protection software be updated using the same processes and the same FAA-approved system that handles the issuance of versions of all other aircraft software. The system should include the following concepts: the FAA should ensure that a secure, ground-based software storage facility is created to house authoritative versions of aircraft software. All authorized versions and variants of airborne software are stored in this secure facility. An authorized human signs each software item previous to storing within this secure facility using the U.S. Federal DSS (FIPS 186). Authorized administrative personnel or systems securely retrieve the appropriate software from the secure facility and download it to the target device within an airplane via formally established processes. This could potentially occur during flight if doing so will not have a detrimental safety impact. To download this software, the administrator will need to establish his or her authentication credentials and to become authorized to download the software via the airplane software download system. That software download system then checks the DSS signature of the software that has been securely retrieved from the secure software storage facility to verify that • the individual who originally signed that software is authorized to sign software for that airline. • the signed software has not been modified subsequent to signing. • the signed software is indeed intended to be deployed onto the device the administrator is attempting to download it onto (including being the appropriate variant). The aircraft’s software download system will only install the retrieved official software into the target device if it successfully passes all three checks. Regardless of whether the checks pass or fail, the maintenance event must be logged, listing the identity of the administrator, a timestamp, what was attempted, and the action taken. 135
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
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Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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