Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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• Partition: some portion of the network believes that it is partitioned from the rest of the network when it is not, • Churn: the forwarding in the network changes (unnecessarily) at a rapid pace, resulting in large variations in the data delivery patterns (and adversely affecting congestion control techniques), • Instability: the protocol becomes unstable so that convergence on a global forwarding state is not achieved, and • Overload: the protocol messages themselves become a significant portion of the traffic the network carries. The damage that might result from attacks against a particular host or network address may include: • Starvation: data traffic destined for the network or host is forwarded to a part of the network that cannot deliver it, • Eavesdrop: data traffic is forwarded through some router or network that would otherwise not see the traffic, affording an opportunity to see the data or at least the data delivery pattern, • Cut: some portion of the network believes that it has no route to the host or network when it is in fact connected, • Delay: data traffic destined for the network or host is forwarded along a route that is in some way inferior to the route it would otherwise take, • Looping: data traffic for the network or host is forwarded along a route that loops, so that the data is never delivered.” (Quoted from Section 3.1.2.1 of reference A-15.) A.3.3 DISRUPTING NETWORK MANAGEMENT. The threats described in the previous subsection directly affect network functions other than routing. For example, the network management subsystem within that AS may be rendered ineffective (and inoperable) simply because the mechanisms for identifying or resolving the resulting network problems that were created by a compromised router have been subverted. That is, network management is dependent upon the viability of the underlying routing system. For example, if the audit records of a compromised router have been modified to erase the attacker’s presence, the network manager will have reduced basis for network fault management since he (or she) would be unable to identify which system was the corrupted one. This is particularly the case within mobile wireless networks, where network performance may be A-17
affected by the signal intermittence properties of the underlying wireless media. Should audit logs be successfully modified to cloak the fact that a router had been compromised within a mobile environment, then the network managers may have a difficult time determining whether the routing table fluctuations, for example, were a function of normal mobile network availability problems due to signal intermittence or whether they had a more sinister origin. A.4 INTEGRITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY ATTACKS. Perhaps the most common security threat that historically resulted from compromised routers has been compromising the confidentiality of the data contained within the packets that the router forwards. The prevalence of this class of attack is kept well hidden from the public due to possible detrimental business impacts should the general public learn of this threat type. However, beginning in 1994, major U.S. Internet service providers began to privately disclose during IETF meetings certain successful (and extremely clever) exploits of this nature. Because these types of attacks are not discussed publicly, it is impossible to know just how pervasive and widespread this problem remains. For it to occur, a successful exploit enables an attacker to insert a backdoor (for future access to the collected data that may be stored locally in the router or forwarded elsewhere) into the router’s OS, coupled with an attacker-built, packet-reading utility that is inserted in the router’s forwarding engine to glean and store (or forward) relevant information obtained from the router-forwarded packets. It is also conceivable that if the attacker can insert a clandestine packet-listening program then he or she could also theoretically insert software to change select packet data, thereby affecting the integrity of the transmitted data itself. IETF protocols (see section 4.5) come equipped with integrity provisions to detect and reject malformed results from this latter type of attack. Thus, integrity attacks are more likely for the subset of communication protocols that have not been configured to provide integrity protections at the protocol level. Unless such packet corruption is sparingly done, it is possible that network managers may observe a higher percentage of message integrity failures, and thus become alerted to this particular activity. In any case, the best defense for recognizing this type of attack is deploying a network instrusion detection system (NIDS) capability on the network and ensuring that the NIDS has a highly intelligent expert system to correctly identify (with the lowest possible percentage of false positives) these classes of attacks. However, the first line of defense for protecting network communications from these types of attacks is to universally use Internet Protocol security. Specifically, the use of the encapsulating security payload (see RFC 4303) is particularly well-suited for effectively protecting transmissions against possible integrity and confidentiality attacks. A-18
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
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