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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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their own classification level nor can they write <strong>in</strong>formation to a lower classification level,<br />

except via the controlled <strong>in</strong>tervention by a trusted subject (e.g., HAG).<br />

The Bell-LaPadula framework is realized with<strong>in</strong> military communications by creat<strong>in</strong>g networks,<br />

each operat<strong>in</strong>g at a specific classification level. These networks can operate as MSLS (see<br />

section 5.2) systems 28 or as DoD networks operat<strong>in</strong>g at system high, where the network is<br />

classified at the highest classification level of the data it conveys. For example, a system-high<br />

secret network could transmit secret <strong>in</strong>formation as well as <strong>in</strong>formation classified below the<br />

secret level (e.g., SBU <strong>in</strong>formation and unclassified <strong>in</strong>formation), but not <strong>in</strong>formation at a higher<br />

classification level than secret.<br />

DoD networks operat<strong>in</strong>g at different classification levels are orthogonal to each other. For<br />

example, they are addressed, by def<strong>in</strong>ition, from address and nam<strong>in</strong>g spaces that perta<strong>in</strong> to their<br />

classification level. This results <strong>in</strong>to network systems hav<strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>in</strong>ct (i.e., unrelated) IP<br />

addresses and nam<strong>in</strong>g spaces than networks operat<strong>in</strong>g at other classification levels <strong>in</strong> general.<br />

“The Bell-LaPadula model is built on the state mach<strong>in</strong>e concept. This concept<br />

def<strong>in</strong>es a set of allowable states (A i ) <strong>in</strong> a system. The transition from one state to<br />

another upon receipt of an <strong>in</strong>put(s) (X j ) is def<strong>in</strong>ed by transition functions (f k ).<br />

The objective of this model is to ensure that the <strong>in</strong>itial state is secure and that the<br />

transitions always result <strong>in</strong> a secure state.<br />

The Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model def<strong>in</strong>es a secure state through three<br />

multilevel properties. The first two properties implement mandatory access<br />

control, and the third one permits discretionary access control. These properties<br />

are def<strong>in</strong>ed as follows:<br />

1. The Simple Security Property (ss Property). States that read<strong>in</strong>g of<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation by a subject at a lower sensitivity level from an object at a higher<br />

sensitivity level is not permitted (no read up).<br />

2. The * (star) Security Property, also known as the conf<strong>in</strong>ement property.<br />

States that writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation by a subject at a higher level of sensitivity to<br />

an object at a lower level of sensitivity is not permitted (no write down).<br />

3. The Discretionary Security Property. Uses an access matrix to specify<br />

discretionary access control.” (Quoted from page 202 of reference 85.)<br />

The Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model, therefore, creates access control protections between<br />

entities at different sensitivity levels. These sensitivity levels are the DoD classification levels<br />

(see section 6.3). A weakness of the Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model is that it only deals<br />

with confidentiality of classified material. It does not address <strong>in</strong>tegrity or availability—the key<br />

28<br />

Other possibilities also exist, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g multiple levels of security and multiple <strong>in</strong>dependent levels of security.<br />

However, the goal of this paragraph is to contrast MSLS with system high because that contrast is relevant to<br />

subsequent airborne network policy issues discussed <strong>in</strong> section 8.2.<br />

81

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