Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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• Network mobility (NEMO): The aircraft consists of a network (operating at a specific level of the IP topology hierarchy) that moves in reference to a largely stable infrastructure. • Node mobility: The aircraft itself is a mobile node within a larger network system. There are two very different IP technologies that may be applied to this model: - Mobile Internet protocol (MIP) - Mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) • Multilevel systems. For example, military COMSEC system (see section 5.2) views the aircraft as participating in two different network systems: the BLACK air-to-ground and/or air-to-air network system and the RED application/human to application/human network. Combinations of the models are possible. For example, this study recommends that aircraft be defined as mobile ASs that have embedded VPN enclave partitions, thus creating a multilevel system. Specifically, aircraft communicate within the BLACK network, which defines the cumulative air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-ground network relationships. They operate as a mobile AS, and RED network enclave partitions, implemented by VPNs, operate as secure partitions within larger aeronautical network system. 5.4.1 Aircraft and Network Mobility. The NEMO algorithm views on-aircraft networks as being mobile networks that change their point of attachment to a larger IP network infrastructure, affecting its reachability in the larger network topology. The approach assumes that the mobile network moves across the larger, comparatively stable IP network infrastructure. The IETF approach assumes that NEMO networks move between Internet attachment points (e.g., between different Internet service providers (ISP)). Of course, attachments are possible at other layers of the IP topology hierarchy. The IETF also approaches NEMO by leveraging mobile IP (MIP, see section 5.4.2) concepts. Other underlying algorithms are also possible. This study recommends (see section 5.5) that the aircraft should be seen as being a mobile AS that moves in reference to other ASs within the larger aeronautical system. In this approach, each individual networked entity within the aircraft is IP addressed, and the network topology changes that occur as the aircraft moves are handled by the BGP protocol that links the aircraft to other ASs. IP addressing issues may arise with this model, depending on whether the aircraft’s IP addresses are associated with a specific service provider (e.g., classless interdomain routing (CIDR) addresses, see RFC 1517) or not (see section 5.5). 5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and MANET). Aircraft can appear as a single mobile node within an AS. This approach is most natural if only a single onboard computing device is remotely visible. However, if multiple onboard computers are visible outside of the aircraft, then the various onboard computers would need to be accessed 60
via that same IP address. Specifically, the node at that address would act as a proxy (see RFC 3234) for the other processors on that aircraft. Because aircraft move in relationship with stable (ground or satellite) network environments, the aircraft will need to be treated as a mobile IP node. IP currently has two different mechanisms for doing this: • The subnetwork that the aircraft’s mobile node connects to can be organized using MANET 14 protocols. MANET protocols self-configure, creating their own network infrastructure in an ad hoc manner as their constituent wireless nodes move to provide routing services among themselves. The system may include one or more dual-homed nodes that contain a wireless interface and an interface connected to wired stable networks. • The mobile node connects within IP networks using MIP. 15 This approach enables a mobile node to retain its permanent home IP address as it moves around the Internet. A home agent, located on the same subnet as the mobile node’s permanent home address, intercepts packets sent to the mobile node’s home address and forwards them to the mobile node’s current address. This forwarding impacts the efficiency of the communications by adding latency and increasing transmission overhead. 5.4.3 Multilevel Network Systems (RED-BLACK, VPN). Section 5.2 described the U.S. DoD networking approach at a high level of abstraction. That section described how DoD systems can leverage COMSEC protections so that networks operating at a given classification level can securely use the network transport services of networks operating at a different classification level. Specifically, it described how air-toground and air-to-air communications can be a network system operating at a different classification layer than onboard networks. Civilian networks can also create multilevel network systems by using VPN technologies (see section 5.6). In common civilian use, VPNs provide a mechanism that permits an end-user’s networks (e.g., a corporation’s AS) to use network resources that are physically controlled by a different IP administrative domain (e.g., an ISP) in such a manner so that the conveying network appears to be an opaque link within the user’s network (e.g., the corporation’s AS). This approach is directly parallel to the DoD networks (i.e., the end-user’s networks are RED and the ISP’s are BLACK) and can be implemented by a number of technologies, including those used by the DoD. These multilevel network systems can define controlled RED network partition enclaves within public (BLACK) network environments. These controlled networks are protected network enclave environments having user populations that are restricted to that enclave only. They, therefore, constitute significantly reduced “networked threat” environments by mitigating the network threats mentioned in section 4.1 (i.e., the threat that any user connected to any network 14 MANET; see http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/manet-charter.html 15 MIP; see http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/mip4-charter.html for IPv4 and http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nextcharter.html 61
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27 and 28: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 29 and 30: • The security viability of curre
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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