Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Private key signature as part of the code-signing process provides the assurance that the CA has certified that the signer of the code is who they claim to be. Integrity occurs by using a signed hash function that authoritatively indicates whether or not the resulting code has been tampered with since it was signed. Executable Code Executable Code Hash algorithm One-way hash Certificate Code signer’s Certificate and public key Signed Certificate Signed Code Figure 24. Code- and Document-Signing Process Step 2: Generate Hash Executable Code Signed Certificate Signed Code Certificate Step 1: Inspect Certificate Executable Code Signed Hash algorithm Public key Step 3: Apply public key One-way hash Step 4: Compare One-way hash Figure 25. Code- and Document-Signing Verification Process A document may also be signed and verified. In all cases, what is assured by code and document signing is the authorship, including the verification that third parties have not subsequently modified the code (or document). In no case does the user receive any assurance that the code itself is safe to run or actually does what it claims. Thus, the actual value of code signing remains a function of the reliability and integrity of the individual that signed that software and the processes that support software development and ongoing life cycle support. Code signing, therefore, is solely a mechanism for a software creator to assert the authorship of the product and validate that others have not modified it. It does not provide the end-user with any claim as to the code’s quality, intent, or safety. 76
As mentioned in section 4.4, the higher assurance integrity entities (e.g., higher software levels) should not rely upon (human) administrative activity. Specifically, it should not be possible to misconfigure or mismanage high-assurance devices (including software) or systems. 6.1.2 Availability. Availability issues directly impact the same three entities that were previously described for integrity: • Adequate availability (or spare capacity) is needed for the physical network media that conveys data communications packets. Network availability can be attacked by causing the intermediate systems that forward packets to not function correctly or else by saturating the network so that entities that need to use it cannot do so. The latter is called a DoS attack, which leverages the fact that network capacity is a finite resource. The first threat can be reduced by deploying intermediate systems that cannot be misconfigured (i.e., are high assurance). DoS exploits can be reduced by ensuring that the capacity of the network exceeds the cumulative network use, either by rate limiting the devices that connect to the network or else by implementing other QoS techniques. If QoS is used, higher software levels applications (e.g., Level A and Level B) should preferentially leverage technology that is implemented so that it cannot be misconfigured. • Availability of the security controls should be assured for a device that is used within a distributed system’s defense-in-depth security protections. This requirement can be met by ensuring that defense-in-depth and control life cycle principals mentioned in section 5.1 are followed. Key system resources should also either have redundancies or else have fail-safe protections. • Availability should be assured for the applications that support airborne operations. These devices need to be designed to be impervious to bad data. They also need to be designed to withstand repeated and prolonged attempted accesses by rogue processes or systems (e.g., DoS attacks). Availability is traditionally addressed by using either real-time systems where information flows are predetermined and systems are preconfigured to guarantee delivery of critical information, or by QoS network capabilities. For safety systems, this property must be designed in mechanisms that must be provided to segregate non-real-time systems from real-time systems and techniques to assess interactions between systems that must be employed, in accordance with the rules that are articulated in section 8.2. 77
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
Page 75 and 76: Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87 and 88: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
Page 127 and 128: using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
Page 135 and 136: (AJ) or low probability of intercep
Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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