Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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9. ANSWERS TO THE PHASE 1 QUESTIONS. This section discusses several aviation safety concerns identified during the original FAA Screening Information Request for this study. These specific questions were a starting point for the work performed in phase 1 of this effort. The exemplar architecture, which was presented in section 8.3, describes the generic airborne network environment that identifies how these specific questions should be answered. 9.1 CONNECTION OF MULTIPLE DOMAINS. Flight safety domains can be compared to security classification domains (see section 6.3), in that ratings are established based on the damage that a failure (or compromise) could cause. In addition, the assurance ratings of those systems are commensurate with the failure risk. This report’s architecture relies upon the Biba Integrity Model to segregate entities that have been classified according to DO-178B Section 2.2.2 software levels. These partitions are accomplished using the IPsec VPN variant. Virtual network enclaves are created for all networked entities that may possibly cause aircraft failure conditions. Specifically, Level A virtual network enclaves are created, as are Levels B, C, and D VPN enclaves. Because the possible failure of Level E entities does not result in aircraft failure risk, Level E entities are not similarly segregated into VPN enclaves. These VPN enclaves materially reduce the security risks for networked devices, directly mitigating many or most of the threats identified in section 4. Specifically, this approach mitigates all identified threats for the higher-assurance enclaves. Nevertheless, each enclave, as well as the total network system, must be further protected by adopting IATF [50] defense-indepth security provisions with full control life cycle protections (see section 5.1) for the reasons explained in section 7. Even though each enclave shares a common underlying network infrastructure, entities in different enclaves are not physically unable to route to entities in other enclaves, nor are any entities within any enclave able to route to nonenclave (Level E) entities, or vice versa. This is due to inherent routing provisions within the VPN design. HAGs can be deployed to provide localized, highly controlled, high-assurance connections between specific devices or specific enclave subgroups that are classified at different safety classification levels. This is the sole provision permitted by the Biba Integrity Model for entities in different enclaves to communicate together. 122
9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMPLEMENTATION. Integrated modular avionics (IMA) describe a distributed real-time computer network aboard aircraft. This network consists of a number of computing modules capable of supporting numerous applications operating at differing safety criticality levels. Section 8.2 specifies the safety requirements derived from the use of the Biba Integrity Model. Four of these requirements are directly applicable to IMA requirements: • Requirement 1 ensures that current FAA assurance provisions are maintained within networked environments. • Requirement 6 enables software entities operating at different software levels but having tight-knit operating relationships to form a common system-high VPN together. That VPN is viewed as operating at the same software level as the software entity with the lowest software level in the VPN. • Requirement 7 ensures that provisions exist to support networked entities needing QoS guarantees from their underlying VPN to support real-time, latency sensitivity, or guaranteed availability requirements. This is accomplished by deploying a dedicated physical network (e.g., LAN) to connect these entities. • Requirement 8 provides a mechanism (i.e., HAGs) where entities or subenclave groupings can communicate with other entities or subenclave groupings operating at different safety-critical levels. Although these four requirements are pertinent to IMA, the specific way in which they are applied is a function of the requirements of a specific implementation. For example, figure 36 shows a possible approach that conforms to the architecture where each of the IMA software entities also has requirements to communicate with other entities that operate at their own software level. (Note: because the devices in this example need to communicate extensively with non-IMA devices at their own classification level, this particular IMA system does not qualify for the Requirement 6 system-high approach. Please also note that the connection of the encapsulation gateways to the high-assurance LAN is not shown in this figure.) 123
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
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Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
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Page 153 and 154: 11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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