Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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the problems that occurred with the more ambitious PBN approaches. It has been used to create distributed firewall systems [70], including the construction of discrete security zones within the network infrastructure (i.e., elements of a network deployment with heightened or specialized security requirements different than the rest of the deployment). This remains a promising approach for implementing PBN systems. The IETF (e.g., its former IPSP working group) has assembled several tools that can be optionally leveraged to create PBN systems using IPsec. • RFC 3586 describes the problem space and solution requirements for developing an IPSP configuration and management framework. • RFC 2704 describes the KeyNote policy language that can optionally be used to construct PBN systems. The KeyNote implementation functions as a compliance engine and is based on role-based access control techniques as encoded within PKI attribute certificates. • Use of IPsec’s ESP (see RFC 4305) in Transport Mode to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, antireplay attack protection, and data integrity services to enhance network security between communicating devices (e.g., hosts-to-hosts, routers-to-routers) at a specific integrity level. The Defense Agency Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Strong Man work originally experimented with integrating KeyNote with IPsec’s Internet Key Exchange (see RFC 4306) protocol to create a very fine-grained authentication and access control infrastructure at the network layer [70]. These communications are secured by using IPsec in Transport Mode between communicating devices. A public implementation of this approach is freely available and is built into the Open BSD 24 Unix OS. 25 This approach creates a tight knit PBN system that has not been widely deployed to date. However, IP deployments have been enhancing their network communication security by increasingly using native (unmodified) IPsec communications between their devices. DoD network systems (see section 5.2) and VPNs (see section 5.6) use IPsec’s ESP in Tunnel Mode to create secured multilevel network systems. This creates controlled and protected network enclaves that have significantly reduced user populations within reduced networked-threat environments. Deployments are also increasingly using IPsec’s ESP in Transport Mode within a common network enclave to create higher assurance communications within that network. Through systematically using native (unmodified) IPsec capabilities, these deployments are creating network environments with significantly improved network security today. 24 25 See http://www.OpenBSD.org Specifically, most of this functionality is built into isakmpd (/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd) within the OpenBSD operating system (see ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/src/sbin/isakmpd/). 72
6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR CERTIFICATION. Daniel Mehan, the former CIO of the FAA, wrote: “For FAA, information systems security extends beyond the computer environment to the security of airspace and the national airspace system. The structural, operating, and procedural foundations of information systems security provide the mechanisms for achieving FAA’s safety, security, and efficiency goals.” [18] Airborne system safety as it relates to software is safeguarded by DO-178B [5] procedures, processes, and guidance. By contrast, traditional IT security is evaluated in terms of CC mechanisms [71, 44, 45, and 46]. The DO-178B processes are primarily focused on safety. The CC processes are primarily focused on security. Carol Taylor, Jim Alves-Foss, and Bob Rinker contrast the two approaches as follows [72 and 73]: “DO-178B is intended to certify that software used in aircraft is developed with “best known” practices and does not contribute to aircraft safety hazards. Software is not ever certified as a standalone component but only as a part of aircraft or engine type. Emphasis in DO-178B is in outlining general policies and procedures to produce safe software in terms of airworthiness requirements and to produce documentation to substantiate that the development requirements have been met. Thus, language and content is high-level and abstract leaving a lot of compliance decisions up to the developer. The Common Criteria (CC) is intended to specify security requirements that a system, hardware or software must satisfy in order to achieve a specific level of assurance. The CC only deals with security functionality of systems and does not address overall development issues except where they affect security. The CC is a much more detailed document in terms of specifying how compliance is achieved for an intended product. Each component of each assurance class has specific action elements and evidence of compliance for both developers and evaluators.” [72] “While the purposes for each certification are clearly different, many of the requirements and procedures are aimed at insuring that the final design and implementation meets certain quality standards. In many cases, these standards are similar, and by modifying or adding to the current procedures in each case, a single common process can be developed which will satisfy both certifications. Since each certification process can potentially be quite expensive, a common process should result in significant cost savings for those systems that must meet both standards.” [73] As Dr. Mehan has repeatedly observed [18 and 19], safety and security are related concerns within the NAS. The U.S. federal government has subsequently studied mechanisms by which safety and security can be combined into a common, integrated process [13, 40, 41, and 72-77] 73
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
Page 75 and 76: Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
Page 79 and 80: deployments. Regional flights that
Page 81 and 82: neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
Page 83 and 84: Interface Interface Customer Site S
Page 85 and 86: Interface Customer’s Application
Page 87: Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
Page 127 and 128: using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
Page 135 and 136: (AJ) or low probability of intercep
Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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